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Abstract
In this paper, we consider zero-sum repeated games in which the maximizer (player or
team) is restricted to strategies requiring no more than a limited amount of randomness.
Particularly, we analyze the maxmin payoff of the maximizer in two models: the first
model (the Neyman-Okada/Gossner-Vieille model) forces the maximizer to randomize
her action in each stage just by conditioning her decision to the outcomes of a given se-
quence of random source, whereas in the second model (the Gossner and Tomala model),
the maximizer is a team of players who are free to privately randomize their corresponding
actions but do not have access to any explicit source of shared randomness needed for
coordination. The works of Gossner and Vieille, and Gossner and Tomala adopted the
method of types to establish their results; however, we utilize the idea of random hashing
which is the core of randomness extractors in the information theory literature. In ad-
dition, we adopt the well-studied tool of simulation of a source from another source. By
utilizing these tools, we are able to simplify the prior results and generalize them as well.
We give a full characterization of the maxmin payoff of the maximizer in the repeated
games under study. Particularly, the maxmin value of the first model is fully described by
the function J (h), where J (h) is the maximum payoff that the maximizer can secure in
the one-shot game by choosing mixed strategies of entropy at most h. In the second part
of the paper, we study the computational aspects of J (h), which has not received much
attention in the game theory literature. We observe the equivalence of this problem with
entropy minimization problems in other scientific contexts. Next, we offer three explicit
lower bounds on the entropy-payoff trade-off curve. To do this, we provide and utilize
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new results for the set of distributions that guarantee a certain payoff for Alice (mixed
strategies corresponding to a security level for Alice). In particular, we study how this set
of distributions shrinks as we increase the security level. While the use of total variation
distance is common in game theory, our derivation indicates the suitability of utilizing
the Re´nyi-divergence of order two.
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Entropy Minimization, Information Theory
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1. Introduction
Nash (1950) proved that if the players of a given one-shot game can randomize on their
pure strategies set according to any probability distribution, then the game has at least
one Nash equilibrium in the mixed strategies. However, if the players have restrictions on
implementing their random actions, then implementable Nash equilibria do not necessarily
exist. Specifically, assume that one of the players is restricted to constructing her actions
as a deterministic function of a given random source. In this setup, Nash equilibria do
3
not necessarily exist. Similarly, in a class of repeated games including two-player zero-
sum games, Nash equilibria do not exist if sufficient random bits are not available to the
players (See Huba´cˇek et al. (2016) and Budinich and Fortnow (2011)). Therefore, when
the players are limited to a given amount of randomness, the maximum payoff that each
player can guarantee, regardless of what strategies the other players choose, becomes of
interest. In this paper, we study the maximum guaranteed payoff in repeated zero-sum
games with bounded randomness under two models. In the first model, we consider a
finitely repeated version of a two-player zero-sum game in which the private randomness
available to one of the players is limited. The second model is a zero-sum game between a
team and an adversary player. In this game, the team players are free to randomize their
corresponding actions privately but do not have access to any explicit source of shared
randomness to coordinate their actions. It is assumed that the adversary player monitors
the played actions imperfectly; hence, the history of actions observed by the team players
is an implicit and limited random source for their coordination.
A version of the first model was studied by Gossner and Vieille (2002). They studied
a repeated version of a zero-sum game G between two players Alice and Bob, where Alice
was the maximizer and Bob was the minimizer. At each stage, first, Alice observed an
independent drawing of a random source X whose distribution was a common knowledge.
Both players then played an action which was monitored by the other player. Alice was
restricted to choosing the action of each stage as a deterministic function of the observed
random source up to that stage along with the history of the previous actions, while
Bob chose his actions at each stage as a random function of the history of the previous
actions. Note that the only source of randomization for Alice was the outcomes of random
source X, while Bob could freely randomize his actions. Gossner and Vieille (2002) proved
that when the number of stages of the repeated game is sufficiently large, the maximum
expected average payoff of Alice is specified by the entropy-payoff trade-off curve of the
one-shot game G. Specifically, for the one-shot game G, define J (h) as the maximum
expected payoff that Alice can secure (regardless of what Bob plays) by playing mixed
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actions of entropy at most h. Let Jcav(.) be the upper concave envelope of J (.). Gossner
and Vieille (2002) proved that the maximum expected average payoff of Alice in the
repeated game converges to Jcav(H(X)), where H(X) is the entropy of random variable
X. This is similar to Shannon’s compression formula H(X), which is defined on a single
copy of the source (single letter), but gives the ultimate compression limit when multiple
copies of the source are observed.
Generalizing the model of Gossner and Vieille (2002), we study a repeated zero-sum
game that considers the possibility of leakage of Alice’s random source sequence to Bob,
and hence we call it the repeated game with leaked randomness source. In other words, we
assume that Bob can imperfectly monitor the random source of Alice. More specifically,
we assume an i.i.d. sequence of pairs (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . distributed according to a given
distribution p(x, y). The sequence of X1, X2, . . . is revealed symbol by symbol (causally)
to Alice as the game is played out, while the sequence of Y1, Y2, . . . is revealed symbol by
symbol to Bob. We can view Yi as the leakage that Bob obtains about Alice’s observation.
As before, Alice cannot randomize freely and is only able to use the randomness in the
sequence of X1, X2, . . .. We show that Jcav(H(X|Y )) is the maximum payoff that Alice
can secure regardless of Bob’s actions. This result is a generalization of the result of
Gossner and Vieille (2002), since when Y is a constant random variable, the conditional
entropy H(X|Y ) reduces to the unconditional entropy H(X). Furthermore, it is obtained
that if a genie provides the values of Y1, Y2, . . . symbol by symbol for Alice, the maximum
payoff she can secure remains unchanged. In other words, knowledge of what Bob knows
about Alice’s observations is not helpful for Alice.
The second model, originally studied by Gossner and Tomala (2007), takes into ac-
count the limited access of a team players to shared randomness needed for coordination
against an adversary. This model, which is called secret correlation in repeated games with
imperfect monitoring, consists of a zero-sum game G played repeatedly between team A
and player B. Team A, consisting of m players, is the maximizer and player B is the
minimizer. At each stage, first, all players choose an action from their corresponding set
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of actions, and then the players of team A observe all of the actions played, while player B
observes a noisy version of the action profile of team A. To choose the action of each stage,
each player can privately randomize her action and utilize the history of her observations
up to that stage. Since the action profile of team A is revealed to player B just through a
noisy channel, the players of team A could extract shared random bits from the profile of
actions, where the extracted bits are almost independent of the observations of player B.
These shared bits can be utilized by players of team A to coordinate their actions in the
upcoming stages. Although the players of team A can randomize their actions privately
and extract shared random bits, the extracted shared bits are limited. Consequently, in
this setup, the set of implementable strategies of team A is constrained by the amount of
shared randomness they could extract and use.
In the model of Gossner and Tomala (2007), at each stage t, player B monitors the
action profile of team A through a noisy channel with output signal St. They assumed
that St was not only seen by player B but also by the players of team A. Generalizing
the result of Gossner and Tomala (2007), we remove the assumption that the players of
team A observe St, and show that this causes no reduction in the payoff of team A.
The above generalizations of the results of Gossner and Vieille (2002) and Gossner and
Tomala (2007) are immediate from our different proof technique. To explain this, consider
that in order to construct the optimal strategies for the above two models of repeated
games, we need to simulate random actions from the available source of randomness. In
the first model, the source of randomness is the random sequence of X1, X2, . . .; in the
second model, the source of randomness is the history of (the imperfectly monitored)
played actions. Gossner and Vieille (2002) and Gossner and Tomala (2007) introduced
a new notion of absolute Kullback distance, which has not been used in the information
theory literature. They took the absolute Kullback distance as the measure of the accuracy
of the simulation, and utilized the method of types to simulate the desired random actions
from the source of randomness. On the other hand, we consider the total variation
distance as the measure of accuracy, and utilize the standard method of random hashing.
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The method of types alone is insufficient for obtaining the generalizations discussed in this
paper, and hashing is necessary. We separate the simulation of random actions from the
source of randomness into two steps: first, we extract sufficient private random bits from
the randomness source, and then simulate the desired actions using the extracted random
bits. Therefore, we need to use two tools for “randomness extraction” and “simulation of
a source from another source”. These tools are available in the literature of information
theory for stationary or nonstationary/ergodic or non-ergodic sources (the information
spectrum methods). Randomness extraction is reviewed in Appendix A of this paper
for completeness. Through utilizing these tools, we are able to simplify the proofs and
generalize the results of Gossner and Vieille (2002) and Gossner and Tomala (2007).
As stated above, the maximum guaranteed payoff of Alice in the repeated game with
leaked randomness source (first model) is characterized in terms of J (h), which is the
maximum payoff that Alice can secure in the one-shot game by choosing mixed actions
with entropy at most h. In this paper, we also study the computational aspects of J (h).
Equivalently, we study the inverse function of J (h) denoted by F (w). F (w) is the mini-
mum entropy of the randomness consumed by Alice to guarantee payoff w in the one-shot
game. We call F (w) the min-entropy function. 1
To compute F (w), first, we need to consider the set of distributions on the action of
Alice that would secure a payoff w for her. This set will be a polytope in the space of all
probability distributions. Then, we should solve an entropy minimization problem over
this polytope in the space of probability distributions. In fact, minimizing and maximizing
entropy arises in a wide range of contexts. Computing maximum entropy under a set of
linear constraints is a well-studied problem with a wide range of applications, e.g., see
Fang et al. (2012), (Cover and Thomas, 2012, p.367) and the principle of maximum
entropy. Kapur et al. (1995) have shown that computing the minimum entropy can be
also quite significant, and Watanabe (1981) has shown that many algorithms for clustering
1One should not confuse our “min-entropy function” with the term “min-entropy” commonly used to
denote the Re´nyi entropy of order infinity.
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and pattern recognition are essentially solving entropy minimization problems. An special
case of the entropy minimization problem (with its own applications) is that of finding
a joint probability of minimum entropy given its marginal distributions (the marginal
distribution is a linear constraint on the joint probability distribution); see Kocaoglu
et al. (2017); Cicalese et al. (2017); Kovacˇevic´ et al. (2015). In addition, Shor (2004) has
shown that the quantum version of the entropy minimization problem is closely related
to a number of noticeable problems in quantum information theory.
Kovacˇevic´ et al. (2012) have shown that entropy minimization problem is an NP-
hard non-convex optimization problem. Since the entropy is a concave function over the
probability simplex, its minimum occurs at a vertex of the feasible domain. As a result,
computation of F (w) leads to a search problem over an exponentially large set. Srikanth
et al. (2003) have proposed an algorithm to solve the entropy minimization problem (and
hence, can be used to compute F (w)), but it has no guarantee of finding the global
minimum for all polytopes.
F (w) provides a game theoretic interpretation of the entropy minimization problem.
In Section 5, we study the properties of function F (w), and utilize probabilistic tools to
obtain a number of easy-to-compute bounds on the value of F (w). While the literature on
game theory makes extensive use of the total variation distance between distributions, we
use the χ2–divergence (or the Tsallis divergence of order two) to derive a lower bound for
F (w). This lower bound is strictly tighter than the bound derived using the total variation
distance showing the applicability of χ2–divergence in the context of game theory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the notation
of this paper, and present a concise discussion of Shannon entropy. In Section 3, we study
a version of our first model studied by Gossner and Vieille (2002), and simplify the proof.
The complete version of our first model namely the repeated game with leaked randomness
source will be studied in Section 3.3. In Section 4, we investigate the problem of secret
correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring, simplify the proof of Gossner
and Tomala (2007), and extend their results. Section 5 is devoted to the computational
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aspects of the min-entropy function and in Section 6, we provide the proofs. Some of the
details including a discussion on randomness extraction are left for the appendices.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
In this paper, we use the notation xj to represent a sequence of variables (x1, x2, . . . , xj).
The same notation is used to represent sequences of random variables, i.e., Xj = (X1, X2, . . . , Xj).
Note that this notation is used for sequences that have two subscripts the same way i.e.,
Xjk = (Xk,1, Xk,2, . . . , Xk,j). Calligraphic letters such as X ,Y ,A,B, . . . represent finite
sets, and |X | denotes the cardinality of the finite set X . Real vectors are represented by
bold lower case letters, and bold uppercase letters are used to represent random vectors.
For example the probability mass function (pmf) of a random variable X with finite sam-
ple space X = {1, 2, . . . , n}, beside the representation pX(x), will be also denoted by a
vector p = (p1, . . . , pn). When it is obvious from the context, we drop the subscript and
use p(x) instead of pX(x). We say that X
n is drawn i.i.d. from p(x) if
p(xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(xi).
We use ∆(A) to denote the probability simplex on alphabet A, i.e., the set of all proba-
bility distributions on the finite set A. The total variation distance between pmfs pX and
qX is denoted by d1(pX , qX) or ‖pX − qX‖TV and is defined as:
d1(pX , qX) = ‖pX − qX‖TV , 1
2
∑
x∈X
|pX(x)− qX(x)|.
When the pmfs are represented by vectors p and q, the total variation distance between
them is represented by d1(p,q) or ‖p−q‖TV . Some of the properties of the total variation
distance are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The following properties hold for the total variation distance:
Property 1: ‖pEpF |E − qEpF |E‖TV = ‖pE − qE‖TV ;
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Property 2: ‖pEpF |E − qEqF |E‖TV ≥ ‖pE − qE‖TV ;
Property 3: ‖pE1pF1 − pE2qF2‖TV ≤ ‖pE1 − pE2‖TV + ‖pF1 − qF2‖TV ;
Property 4: For an arbitrary deterministic function f on the sample space of E1 and
E2 we have ‖pf(E1) − pf(E2)‖TV ≤ ‖pE1 − pE2‖TV ;
Property 5: ‖pE1pF − pE2pF‖TV = ‖pE1 − pE2‖TV .
2.2. Entropy function
Let X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y be two random variables with joint probability distribution
pX,Y and respective marginal distributions pX and pY . The Shannon entropy (or simply
the entropy) of the random variable X is defined to be:
H(X) =
∑
x∈X
−pX(x) log(pX(x)),
where 0 log(0) = 0 by continuity and all logarithms in this paper are in base two. Since
the entropy is a function of the pmf pX , we sometimes write H(pX) (or H(p) when the
pmf is denoted by probability vector p) instead of H(X).
The conditional Shannon entropy (or simply the conditional entropy) of X given Y is
defined as:
H(X|Y ) =
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
−pXY (x, y) log(pX|Y (x|y))
=
∑
y∈Y
pY (y)H(X|Y = y),
where H(X|Y = y) = ∑x∈X −pX|Y (x|y) log(pX|Y (x|y)).
Using the definition of entropy and conditional entropy one can check that
H(X, Y ) = H(Y ) +H(X|Y ).
Utilizing the above property iteratively, the chain rule for a sequence of random variables
is obtained:
H(Xn) = H(X1) +
n∑
i=2
H(Xi|X i−1).
Furthermore, the following properties hold for the entropy function:
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• H(X) ≥ 0.
• H(X1, X2) ≥ H(X1).
• Let f(x) be an arbitrary deterministic function then H(f(X)) ≤ H(X).
3. Repeated games with a bounded randomness source
In this section, we revisit the repeated game studied by Gossner and Vieille (2002).
The high-level picture of the proof of Gossner and Vieille (2002) is as follows: it uses
the so-called “block-Markov” proof technique of information theory, where we divide time
into a number of blocks and Alice uses her observations in each block to produce the
actions for the next block. Our goal is to show that the high-level picture of the proof
presented in Gossner and Vieille (2002) can be made precise in an easier manner using
standard information theory tools.
3.1. Problem definition
Let us first begin with reviewing the definition of the repeated game with a bounded
randomness source studied by Gossner and Vieille (2002). Consider a T stage repeated
zero-sum game between players Alice(A) and Bob(B) with respective finite action sets
A = {1, . . . , n} and B = {1, . . . , n′}, where n and n′ are natural numbers. Let XT =
(X1, X2, . . . , XT ) be a sequence of random variables drawn i.i.d. from a sample space
X with law pX . In every stage t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, first, Alice observes random source
Xt privately, and then, Alice and Bob choose actions At ∈ A and Bt ∈ B, respec-
tively. At the end of stage t, both players observe the chosen actions At and Bt and
Alice gets stage payoff uAt,Bt from Bob. In order to choose actions at stage t, play-
ers make use of the history of their observations up to stage t, which is denoted by
Ht1 = (X1, A1, B1, . . . , Xt−1, At−1, Bt−1, Xt) for Alice, and H
t
2 = (A1, B1, . . . , At−1, Bt−1)
for Bob. Let σt : (A×B)t−1×X t → A and τt : (A×B)t−1 → B be the functions mapping
the history of observations of Alice and Bob to actions at stage t, so At = σt(H
t
1) and
Bt = τt(H
t
2). Note that Alice does not have access to any private source of randomness
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except Ht1, so she has to use the deterministic function σt(·), while Bob can utilize the
random function τt(·). We call the T -tuples σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σT ) and τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τT )
the strategies of Alice and Bob, respectively. The expected average payoff for Alice up to
stage T induced by strategies σ and τ is denoted by λT (σ, τ), which is
λT (σ, τ) = Eσ,τ
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
uAt,Bt
]
, (1)
where Eσ,τ denotes the expectation with respect to the distribution induced by i.i.d.
repetitions of pX and strategies σ and τ . Alice wishes to maximize λT (σ, τ), and Bob
wishes to minimize it.
Definition 2. Let v be an arbitrary real value:
• Alice can secure v if there exists a strategy σ∗ for Alice such that for all strategy τ
of Bob we have lim infT→∞ λT (σ∗, τ) ≥ v.
• Bob defends v if given an arbitrary strategy σ for Alice, there exists a strategy τ ∗
for Bob such that lim supT→∞ λT (σ, τ
∗) ≤ v.
• v is the maxmin value of the repeated game, if Alice can secure v and Bob can defend
v.
Theorem 3 (Gossner and Vieille (2002)). The maxmin value of the repeated game with
bounded randomness source defined in Section 3.1 is Jcav(H(X)), where Jcav(h) is the
upper concave envelope of
J (h) = max
p∈∆(A),H(p)≤h
min
b∈B
Ep[uA,b], (2)
where Ep denotes the expectation with respect to p.
In Section 3.2, we give a simplified proof of Gossner and Vieille (2002) that explains
how Alice can secure Jcav(H(X)). The complete proof is left for Section 3.3, where we
present a generalized version of the above result.
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3.2. Simplifying the proof of Gossner and Vieille (2002)
As mentioned in Gossner and Vieille (2002), the upper concave envelope Jcav(·) at
h = H(X) can be expressed as the convex combination
γJ (H(p(1)A )) + (1− γ)J (H(p(2)A )),
for some γ ∈ [0, 1] and pmfs p(1)A and p(2)A in ∆(A), where p(1)A and p(2)A secure respective
payoffs J (H(p(1)A )) and J (H(p(2)A )) in the one-shot game and the following equality is
satisfied:
γH(p
(1)
A ) + (1− γ)H(p(2)A ) = H(X).
As a result, it suffices to show that for any p
(1)
A and p
(2)
A satisfying
γH(p
(1)
A ) + (1− γ)H(p(2)A ) < H(X),
Alice can use the source of randomness X to secure payoffs arbitrarily close to
γmin
b∈B
E
p
(1)
A
[uA,b] + (1− γ) min
b∈B
E
p
(2)
A
[uA,b],
which is the weighted average of the payoffs that input distributions p
(1)
A and p
(2)
A secure.
Let the game be played for T stages. Take some T of the form T = NL, and divide
the total T stages into N blocks of length L. Excluding the first block, we generate the
action sequence of each block as a function of the random source observed during the
previous block (we ignore the payoff of the first block throughout the discussion, since by
taking the number of blocks N large enough, the contribution of the first block in Alice’s
net average payoff becomes negligible). More specifically, excluding the first block, each
block is further divided into two subblocks, where the first subblock takes up γ fraction
of the block as illustrated in Fig. 1. Alice aims to use her observed random source during
the previous block to play almost i.i.d. according to p
(1)
A during the first subblock and
according to p
(2)
A during the second subblock. In addition, Alice wants her action at any
given stage to be also almost independent of Bob’s observations up to that stage. Observe
that if Alice could produce actions that were perfectly i.i.d. according to p
(1)
A in the first
13
Time slots in which Alice draws a random action with law p
(2)
A
Time slots in which Alice draws a random action with law p
(1)
A
Time slots of the first block in which Alice plays the pure action 1 ∈ A
1 2 3 . . . N
1 2 . . . L 1 . . . dγLe . . . L 1 . . . dγLe . . . L . . . 1 . . . dγLe . . . L
Figure 1: Illustration of the block Markov strategy
subblock and perfectly i.i.d. according to p
(2)
A in the second subblock, both independent
of Bob’s observations, then in γ fraction of the stages in a block, she would secure the
average payoff of minb∈B Ep(1)A [uA,b] per action, and in the remaining 1 − γ fraction she
would secure the payoff of minb∈B Ep(2)A [uA,b]. This would give Alice a total payoff of
γmin
b∈B
E
p
(1)
A
[uA,b] + (1− γ) min
b∈B
E
p
(2)
A
[uA,b].
We will now show that regarding the total variation distance as the measure of accuracy,
Alice can play almost i.i.d. according to p
(1)
A during the first subblock of each block, and
almost i.i.d. according to p
(2)
A during the second subblock of each block. Therefore, Alice
can secure payoffs arbitrarily close to γminb∈B Ep(1)A [uA,b] + (1 − γ) minb∈B Ep(2)A [uA,b] and
this will complete the proof.
Remember that γH(p
(1)
A ) + (1− γ)H(p(2)A ) < H(X). Intuitively speaking, since Alice’s
observation from a block has entropy LH(X), which is larger than the entropy of her
intended action in the next block LγH(p
(1)
A ) +L(1− γ)H(p(2)A ), she should be able to find
a proper mapping to produce her actions in the current block from her observations in
the preceding block. Gossner and Vieille (2002) propose such a mapping and put effort
to prove its correctness. This is where most of the effort is spent. The essential problem
here is to simulate a source from another source (here the observations from one block to
actions in the next block). This problem is solved in the information theory literature.
As stated below in Lemma 6, which is adopted from (Han, 2003, p. 110), the measure
of relevance to compare between the two sources is inf-entropy and sup-entropy, rather
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than entropy. However, for i.i.d. sources (or concatenation of i.i.d. sources), inf-entropy
and sup-entropy reduce to the normal Shannon entropy, as discussed in Remark 5 below.
Definition 4. Sup-entropy and inf-entropy of a random source Z1, Z2, . . . are denoted by
H(Z) and H(Z), respectively, and defined as follows:
H(Z) = p- lim inf
L→∞
1
L
log
1
pZL(ZL)
,
H(Z) = p- lim sup
L→∞
1
L
log
1
pZL(ZL)
,
where for a random sequence {Wt},
p- lim inf
t→∞
Wt = sup
{
β| lim
t→∞
Pr[Wt < β] = 0
}
,
p- lim sup
t→∞
Wt = inf
{
β| lim
t→∞
Pr[Wt > β] = 0
}
.
Remark 5. If ZL = (Z1, Z2, . . . , ZL) is a concatenation of two sequences of i.i.d. random
variables on Z with distribution
pZL(z
L) =
dγLe∏
i=1
p(1)(zi)
L∏
i=dγLe+1
p(2)(zi),
where dae is the smallest integer greater than or equal to a, then, we have
lim
L→∞
1
L
log
1
pZL(ZL)
= lim
L→∞
1
L
dγLe∑
i=1
log
1
p(1)(Zi)
+
L∑
i=dγLe+1
log
1
p(2)(Zi)

= γ
∑
z∈Z
p(1)(z) log
1
p(1)(z)
+ (1− γ)
∑
z∈Z
p(2)(z) log
1
p(2)(z)
with probability 1
= γH(p(1)) + (1− γ)H(p(2)) with probability 1,
where the first equality results from the independence of the random variables Z1, Z2, . . .
and the second equality follows from the weak law of large numbers. Thus
p- lim inf
L→∞
1
L
log
1
pZL(ZL)
= γH(p(1)) + (1− γ)H(p(2)),
p- lim sup
L→∞
1
L
log
1
pZL(ZL)
= γH(p(1)) + (1− γ)H(p(2)),
hence H(Z) = H(Z) = γH(p(1)) + (1− γ)H(p(2)) = limL→∞ 1/LH(ZL).
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Lemma 6 (Simulation of a source from another source). For each natural number L, con-
sider an arbitrary distribution p
(L)
XL
on sequences (x1, x2, . . . , xL) ∈ X L. Similarly, for each
natural number L, consider an arbitrary distribution q
(L)
AL
on sequences (a1, a2, . . . , aL) ∈
AL. If H(X) > H(A), then, for each natural number L, there exists a mapping ϕL :
X L → AL such that the total variation distance between the distributions of ϕL(XL) and
AL vanishes asymptotically, i.e.,
lim
L→∞
‖q(L)
AL
− p(L)
ϕL(XL)
‖TV = 0.
The proof of Lemma 6 can be found in (Han, 2003, p. 110).
Remark 7. Observe that limL→∞ ‖pAL − pϕL(XL)‖TV = 0 in the above lemma implies
that ϕL(X
L) is almost statistically indistinguishable from pAL for large values of L. In
other words, there is no statistical test that can distinguish between pAL and pϕL(XL) with
a non-negligible probability.
Take some  > 0. Since γH(p
(1)
A ) + (1 − γ)H(p(2)A ) < H(X), Lemma 6 and Remark 5
imply that there exist mappings ϕL : X L → AL such that for large L, the pmf of AL =
ϕL(X
L) is approximated (in total variation distance) as∥∥∥∥∥∥pAL(aL)−
dγLe∏
t=1
p
(1)
A (at)
L∏
t=dγLe+1
p
(2)
A (at)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ . (3)
Therefore, by dividing the T stages into N blocks of L stages, we construct a strategy σ
for Alice as follows: in each block (excluding the first block) Alice chooses action sequence
ALc = ϕL(X
L
p ), where X
L
p is the randomness source observed during the previous block;
i.e., ALc is for the current block, but X
L
p is for the previous block.
The ideal distribution
∏dγLe
t=1 p
(1)
A (at)
∏L
t=dγLe+1 p
(2)
A (at) gives Alice a payoff of
dγLemin
b∈B
E
p
(1)
A
[uA,b] + (L− dγLe) min
b∈B
E
p
(2)
A
[uA,b].
Alice’s actual distribution is within  total variation distance of the ideal distribution. By
relating the total variation distance to the payoff differences, we obtain that difference
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between the payoff under the actual distribution and the ideal one is at most  times 2LM,
where M is the maximum absolute value entry of the payoff table (LM is the maximum
absolute value entry of the L repetitions of the game). Thus, the distance between the
average payoff of the block differs by at most 2M from the average payoff under the ideal
distribution. This completes the proof.
Remark 8. We constructed the strategy σ for the case T = NL. In general, for T =
NL + δ, where δ < L, one can extend the first block to contain L + δ stages and choose
N large enough to diminish the effect of the first block on the average payoff.
3.3. Generalized model: leakage of the randomness source
We generalize the model of the repeated game of Section 3.1 and define the re-
peated game with leaked randomness source as follows: Let XT = (X1, X2, . . . , XT )
and Y T = (Y1, Y2, . . . , YT ) be two sequences of random variables such that (Xt, Yt), for
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, are drawn i.i.d. from a sample space X × Y with law pXY . In ev-
ery stage t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, Alice and Bob observe respective random sources Xt and
Yt privately and choose actions At ∈ A and Bt ∈ B. Thus the only difference of this
model with the model of Section 3.1 is that in every stage t, Bob observes Yt which is
related to the observation of Alice Xt; hence, the history of observations of Bob is H
t
2 =
(Y1, A1, B1, . . . , Yt−1, At−1, Bt−1, Yt) and Bt = τt(Ht2), where τt : (A×B)t−1 ×Y t → B. As
before, the history of observations of Alice is Ht1 = (X1, A1, B1, . . . , Xt−1, At−1, Bt−1, Xt).
Note that Alice does not have access to any private sources of randomness except Ht1 and
hence, she has to use the deterministic function σt(·), while Bob can utilize the random
function τt(·). Alice (respectively Bob) wishes to maximize (respectively minimize) the
expected average payoff λT (σ, τ) defined in Equation (1). Note that if we set Yt to be con-
stant random variables, the above repeated zero-sum game reduces to the one considered
in Section 3.1.
The maxmin value of the repeated game with leaked randomness source is defined as
in Definition 2 and characterized as follows:
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Theorem 9. The maxmin value of the repeated game with leaked randomness source
defined in Section 3.3 is Jcav(H(X|Y )), where Jcav(.) is defined as in Theorem 3.
To prove Theorem 9, in Section 3.3.1, we show that Alice can secure Jcav(H(X|Y )) and
in Section 3.3.2, we show that Bob can defend Jcav(H(X|Y )). Therefore, by definition,
Jcav(H(X|Y )) is the maxmin value of the repeated game. Before going to Sections 3.3.1
and 3.3.2, we present a corollary followed by an example.
Corollary 10. Consider the case in which besides the sequence X1, X2, . . . , Alice also
observes the sequence Y1, Y2, . . . ; therefore, X
′
t = (Xt, Yt) is the observation of Alice at
stage t. Since H(X ′|Y ) = H(X|Y ), the maxmin value of the game is still Jcav(H(X|Y ))
which is equal to the maxmin value of the game in which Alice does not observe the se-
quence Y1, Y2, . . . . Therefore, Alice’s access to Y1, Y2, . . . does not help her. This parallels
the classical result of Slepian and Wolf (1973) in information theory.
Example 11. (Matching pennies) Consider the matching pennies game with A = B =
{0, 1} and payoffs:
u0,0 = u1,1 = 1, u0,1 = u1,0 = 0.
Assume that Alice observes (symbol by symbol) an i.i.d. sequence of binary random vari-
ables X1, X2, . . ., where
pXi(0) = q, pXi(1) = 1− q.
Each Xi is revealed to Bob with probability α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, Bob observes (symbol by
symbol) a sequence Y1, Y2, . . . such that with probability α, Yi = Xi and with probability
1− α, Yi = null.
Roughly speaking, α fraction of the bits of Alice are revealed to Bob. If Alice is made
aware of which of her bits are compromised and leaked to Bob, she can drop the compro-
mised bits and keep the 1 − α fraction of the secret bits. In this way, she can distill an
average of (1−α)H(q) random bits per observation. It is known from Gossner and Vieille
(2002) that for the matching pennies game, Jcav(h) = h/2. Thus, using (1− α)H(q) bits
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per stage, Alice can secure payoff (1− α)H(q)/2. The above theorem says that Alice can
secure the same payoff even without knowing which of her bits are compromised.
3.3.1. Proof of Theorem 9: Alice can secure Jcav(H(X|Y ))
To show that Alice can secure any payoff less than Jcav(H(X|Y )), we extend and
simplify the proof of Gossner and Vieille (2002). As before, the upper concave envelope
Jcav(·) at h = H(X|Y ) can be expressed as the convex combination
γJ (H(p(1)A )) + (1− γ)J (H(p(2)A ))
for some γ ∈ [0, 1] and pmfs p(1)A and p(2)A in ∆(A) where p(1)A and p(2)A secure respective
payoffs J (H(p(1)A )) and J (H(p(2)A )) in the one-shot game, and the following equality is
satisfied:
γH(p
(1)
A ) + (1− γ)H(p(2)A ) = H(X|Y ).
As a result, it suffices to show that for any p
(1)
A and p
(2)
A satisfying
γH(p
(1)
A ) + (1− γ)H(p(2)A ) < H(X|Y ),
Alice can secure payoffs arbitrarily close to
γmin
b∈B
E
p
(1)
A
[uA,b] + (1− γ) min
b∈B
E
p
(2)
A
[uA,b].
Again, the idea is to utilize the block-Markov proof technique. Take some T of the
form T = NL, and divide the total T stages into N blocks of length L. Each block is
divided into two subblocks as before. Excluding the first block, Alice wants to play almost
i.i.d. according to p
(1)
A during the first subblock, and almost i.i.d. according to p
(2)
A during
the second subblock.
By symmetry, we only need to consider the payoff that Alice gets in one of the blocks.
For notational simplicity, we denote the observations of Alice and Bob in the previous
block by XLp and Y
L
p respectively, and use A
L
c and B
L
c to denote their actions in the
current block. Instead of Lemma 6 in the previous section, the proof relies on the following
proposition whose proof is given in Section 6.1:
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Proposition 12. Let (XLp , Y
L
p ) be drawn i.i.d. from pXY (xp, yp), γ ∈ [0, 1] be an arbitrary
real number, and p
(1)
A and p
(2)
A be arbitrary distributions on A such that
γH(p
(1)
A ) + (1− γ)H(p(2)A ) < H(X|Y ).
Then, for any  > 0, there exists a natural number L˜ and mappings ψL : X L → AL such
that for all L ≥ L˜ and ALc = ψL(XLp ),∥∥∥∥∥∥pALc ,Y Lp (aLc , yLp )− pY Lp (yLp )
dγLe∏
t=1
p
(1)
A (ac,t)
L∏
t=dγLe+1
p
(2)
A (ac,t)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
TV
< . (4)
Note that pY Lp (y
L
p )
∏dγLe
t=1 p
(1)
A (ac,t)
∏L
t=dγLe+1 p
(2)
A (ac,t) is the distribution of the ideal
independent actions desired by Alice, whereas pALc ,Y Lp (a
L
c , y
L
p ) is the real joint distribution.
Let Alice use the actions ALc = (Ac,1, Ac,2, . . . , Ac,L) in the current block, where A
L
c =
ψL(X
L
p ) and ψL is the mapping of Proposition 12. Because the X-source is i.i.d., the
X-source for different blocks are independent, and random variable ALc (a function of
XLp ) is independent of Alice’s action in all the previous blocks. As a result, even though
Bob has access to the entire past history of the game and his Y -source observations, he
obtains information about XLp only through his source Y
L
p and Alice’s prior actions in the
current block. In other words, Bc,t, Bob’s action at the t-th stage of the current block, is
conditionally independent of XLp given Y
L
p , A
t−1
c , B
t−1
c . Since A
L
c = ψL(X
L
p ), Bc,t is also
conditionally independent of Ac,t, Ac,t+1, · · · , Ac,L given Y Lp , At−1c , Bt−1c . Thus,
p(bLc |yLp , aLc ) =
L∏
t=1
p(bc,t|yLp , at−1c , bt−1c ).
Then, utilizing the first property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables
E = (ALc , Y
L
p ) and F = B
L
c we conclude from (4) that∥∥∥pALc ,Y Lp (aLc , yLp ) L∏
t=1
p(bc,t|yLp , at−1c , bt−1c ) (5)
− pY Lp (yLp )
dγLe∏
t=1
p
(1)
A (ac,t)p(bc,t|yLp , at−1c , bt−1c )
L∏
t=dγLe+1
p
(2)
A (ac,t)p(bc,t|yLp , at−1c , bt−1c )
∥∥∥
TV
< .
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Utilizing the second property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables E =
(ALc , B
L
c ) and F = Y
L
p , we conclude that the distance between the actual actions pALc ,BLc (a
L
c , b
L
c )
and the ideal one is less than or equal to , i.e.,∥∥∥pALc ,BLc (aLc , bLc )− dγLe∏
t=1
p
(1)
A (ac,t)p(bc,t|at−1c , bt−1c )
L∏
t=dγLe+1
p
(2)
A (ac,t)p(bc,t|at−1c , bt−1c )
∥∥∥
TV
< .
(6)
As before, by relating the total variation distance to the payoff differences, we obtain
that the average payoff differs by at most 2M from the average payoff under the ideal
distribution. This completes the proof.
3.3.2. Proof of Theorem 9: Bob can defend Jcav(H(X|Y ))
This is an extension of the proof given in Neyman and Okada (2000); Gossner and
Vieille (2002). Let σ be an arbitrary strategy for Alice and generate strategy τ for Bob
as follows: given ht2, an arbitrary history of observations of Bob until stage t, τt(h
t
2) is the
best choice of Bob that minimizes the expected payoff at stage t, i.e.,
τt(h
t
2) ∈ arg min
b∈B
Eσ
[
uAt,b|Ht2 = ht2
]
,
where Eσ denotes the expectation with respect to the probability distribution induced
by σ and i.i.d. repetitions of pX,Y . Note that conditional on the observation h
t
2 of Bob,
Alice’s action At has entropy H(At|Ht2 = ht2), thus,
Eσ,τ
[
uAt,Bt |Ht2 = ht2
] ≤ J (H(At|Ht2 = ht2)) ≤ Jcav (H(At|Ht2 = ht2)) . (7)
Therefore, we have
Eσ,τ [uAt,Bt ] =
∑
ht2∈(A×B)t−1×Yt
Pr
[
Ht2 = h
t
2
]
Eσ,τ
[
uAt,Bt|Ht2 = ht2
]
≤
∑
ht2∈(A×B)t−1×Yt
Pr
[
Ht2 = h
t
2
]Jcav (H(At|Ht2 = ht2))
≤ Jcav
 ∑
ht2∈(A×B)t−1×Yt
Pr
[
Ht2 = h
t
2
]
H(At|Ht2 = ht2)

= Jcav
(
H(At|Ht2)
)
, (8)
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where the second inequality is implied by applying Jensen’s inequality to concave function
Jcav(·). By definition of λT (σ, τ) and using (8) we have
λT (σ, τ) ≤
T∑
t=1
1
T
Jcav
(
H(At|Ht2)
)
≤ Jcav
(
T∑
t=1
1
T
H(At|Ht2)
)
(9)
= Jcav
(
T∑
t=1
1
T
H(At|Y t, At−1, Bt−1)
)
= Jcav
(
T∑
t=1
1
T
H(At|Y T , At−1)
)
(10)
= Jcav
(
1
T
H(AT |Y T )
)
≤ Jcav
(
1
T
H(XT |Y T )
)
(11)
= Jcav (H(X|Y )) ,
where (9) follows from applying Jensen’s inequality to concave function Jcav. Note that
given the strategy τ for Bob, Bt−1 is a deterministic function of Y t and At−1, thus
H(At|Y t, At−1, Bt−1) = H(At|Y t, At−1); furthermore, At and Bt are causally generated
from i.i.d. sequences XT and Y T , so (At, A
t−1, Y t) is independent of (Yt+1, Yt+2, . . . , YT )
and hence H(At|Y t, At−1) = H(At|Y T , At−1), which implies (10). To prove (11), consider
that given strategies of the players and the sequence Y T , AT is a deterministic function of
XT and hence H(XT |Y T ) ≥ H(AT |Y T ); therefore, since Jcav(·) is an increasing function,
(11) follows.
Thus, for all strategy σ of Alice there exists a strategy τ for Bob such that lim supT→∞ λT (σ, τ) ≤
Jcav (H(X|Y )). Hence, Bob can defend Jcav (H(X|Y )).
4. Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
In this section, we revisit the repeated game with imperfect monitoring studied by
Gossner and Tomala (2007). The main contribution of this part is to simplify the proof
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of Gossner and Tomala (2007) and generalize their results.
4.1. Problem definition
Consider a T stage repeated zero-sum game between team A and player B, where team
A consists of m players {1, 2, . . . ,m} with respective finite actions sets A1,A2, . . . ,Am.
Let A = A1 × A2 × · · · × Am and B denote the finite actions sets of team A and player
B, respectively. In every stage t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, all players choose an action from their
corresponding sets of actions. Let At denote the action profile of team A and Bt denote
the action of player B at stage t. At the end of stage t, team A gets payoff uAt,Bt from
player B and all players of team A observe the chosen actions At and Bt, while player B
observes Bt and St ∈ S, where St is a noisy version of At with conditional distribution
Pr[St = st|At = at] = pS|A(st|at). In order to choose the actions of stage t, players make
use of the history of their observations until stage t, which is denoted by Ht1 = (A
t−1, Bt−1)
for players of team A and Ht2 = (B
t−1, St−1) for player B. Let σi,t : (A × B)t−1 → Ai
and τt : (B × S)t−1 → B be the random functions mapping the history of observations
of arbitrary player i in team A and player B to their actions at stage t, thus, At =
(σ1,t(H
t
1), σ2,t(H
t
1), . . . , σm,t(H
t
1)) and Bt = τt(H
t
2). Let σt = (σ1,t, σ2,t, . . . , σm,t). We call
the T -tuples σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σT ) and τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τT ) the strategies of team A and
player B, respectively. The expected average payoff for team A, λT (σ, τ), and the maxmin
value of the game are defined in a similar way as in Section 3.1.
Remark 13. In the definition of the repeated game with imperfect monitoring, Gossner
and Tomala (2007) assumed that the signals St were also observed by the players of team
A, whereas we assume that the signals St are not observed by the players of team A. We
generalize the result of Gossner and Tomala (2007) by showing that the maxmin value of
the game remains the same with this change in assumption.
Definition 14. Let Π be a subset of ∆(A) containing the distributions of independent
random actions on A = A1 ×A2 × · · · × Am, i.e.,
Π = {pA = pA1pA2 . . . pAm|pAi ∈ ∆(Ai),∀i = 1, . . . ,m} .
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Furthermore, given random variables R ∈ R and A ∈ A with joint distribution pAR,
functions pi(A|R = r) (the security level of A given R = r) and pi(A|R) (the security
level of A given R) are defined as follows:
pi(A|R = r) = min
b∈B
E[uA,b|R = r]
and
pi(A|R) =
∑
r∈R
pR(r)pi(A|R = r).
Observe that pi(A|R) is in terms of an average over values of R and we have chosen
the notation pi(A|R) as its definition resembles the way conditional entropy is defined in
information theory.
Theorem 15. The maxmin value of the repeated game with imperfect monitoring is
w = maxpi(A|R),
where the maximization is over all random variables A ∈ A, S ∈ S, R ∈ R = {0, 1} and
Q ∈ Q = {1, 2, 3, · · · , 2|A|}, satisfying
pSARQ(s, a, r, q) = pRQ(r, q)pA|Q(a|q)pS|A(s|a), (12)
pA|Q(a|q) ∈ Π, (13)
H(QA|SR) ≥ H(Q|R). (14)
The set Π and the function pi(A|R) are defined in Definition 14 and pS|A is the fixed
conditional distribution that generates the monitoring signals St of the repeated game with
imperfect monitoring.
Remark 16. The statement of the above theorem has a different (but equivalent) form
than the one given in Gossner and Tomala (2007). In particular, Gossner and Tomala
(2007) have expressed the solution as an optimization problem over the set of “distributions
of distributions”. The computational aspects of the solution given by Gossner and Tomala
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(2007) has been studied by Gossner et al. (2009). In our characterization, because all
the variables have finite alphabet sets, the above form is computable and is expressed as a
maximization problem over a compact and bounded set of probability distribution.
In Section 4.2, we show that team A can secure w, and in Section 4.3, we show that
player B can defend w even when players of team A, in addition to At and Bt, observe the
signals St. Thus, w is the maxmin value of the repeated game with imperfect monitoring
regardless of whether team A observe St or not.
4.2. Proof of Theorem 15: Payoff secured by team A
We begin with investigating the special case in which player B perfectly monitors
the actions of team A; i.e., there exists a deterministic function f : S → A such that
for all stages t, we have At = f(St). Let A, S, R,Q be arbitrary random variables with
joint pmf pRQAS in the feasible set of the maximization in the statement of the theorem.
Considering that A = f(S), we have:
H(QA|RS)−H(Q|R) = H(Q|RS)−H(Q|R) ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from (14). On the other hand, we have H(Q|RS) ≤ H(Q|R).
Hence, H(Q|RS) = H(Q|R). Since H(Q|RS) − H(Q|R) = H(S|RQ) − H(S|R), we
obtain that H(S|RQ) = H(S|R). It is known that H(S|RQ) ≤ H(S|R) (conditioning
reduces entropy), and equality H(S|RQ) = H(S|R) holds only if for all r ∈ R and
q ∈ Q such that pRQ(r, q) > 0, we have pS|R=r,Q=q = pS|R=r. Since A is a deterministic
function of S, we also conclude that for all r ∈ R and q ∈ Q such that pRQ(r, q) > 0,
we have pA|R=r,Q=q = pA|R=r. On the other hand, Equations (12) and (13) imply that
pA|R=r,Q=q = pA|Q=q ∈ Π; thus, for all r with positive probability, we have pA|R=r ∈ Π.
Let T be the total number of the stages of the game. Construct a strategy σ for
team A as follows: in the first dpR(0)T e stages, the team players play i.i.d. according to
pA|R=0, and in the remaining T − dpR(0)T e stages, they play i.i.d. according to pA|R=1.
Note that since for all r with positive probability, pA|R=r belongs to Π, the team players
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can implement the above strategy distributively without the need for shared randomness.
When T tends to infinity, the expected average payoff secured by σ converges to pi(A|R),
and hence, they can secure pi(A|R).
Next, we assume that player B monitors the actions of the team players imperfectly,
i.e., Bob is unable to compute A as a deterministic function of S. Let A ∈ A, S ∈ S,
R ∈ R = {0, 1} and Q ∈ Q = {1, 2, 3, · · · , 2|A|} be arbitrary random variables with joint
pmf pRQAS satisfying (12), (13) and the strict form of (14), i.e.,
H(QA|RS) > H(Q|R). (15)
The boundary case, H(QA|RS) = H(Q|R), will be addressed in Remark 19. We now
show that team A can secure payoff pi(A|R). Since
pi(A|R) = pR(0) min
b∈B
E[uA,b|R = 0] + pR(1) min
b∈B
E[uA,b|R = 1],
it suffices to show that players of team A can choose their actions almost i.i.d. according
to pA|R(a|0) in γ = pR(0) portion of stages and almost i.i.d according to pA|R(a|1) in
1 − γ = pR(1) portion of stages, while the action of each stage is almost independent of
the history of observations of player B until that stage.
In the rest of the proof, the ideal joint distribution pRQAS is assumed to be given and
fixed. Random variable A should not be confused with A1 or A
T = (A1,A2, · · · ,AT )
which denote the action profile of players of team A at the first stage and the T time
instances, respectively.
The block-Markov technique: As in the previous section, team A utilizes the
block-Markov strategy. We assume that the game is played over one block of length
kL (the first block) followed by N blocks of length L. Therefore, the total number of
repetitions of the game is T = kL + NL. The first block is of length kL, which will
be specified later; this block is sufficiently long block to provide enough randomness to
initialize the block-Markov strategy for the N blocks of length L. Excluding the first
block, each block is divided into two subblocks of length dγLe and L − dγLe. Team A
aims to play almost i.i.d. according to pA|R(a|0) in the first subblock and according to
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pA|R(a|1) in the second subblock, while the action of each stage is almost independent
of the history of observations of player B until that stage. To do so, in each block, the
players of team A extract a sequence of shared randomness, which is almost independent
of the observations of player B, to correlate their actions in the next block. For arbitrary
block i ≥ 3 (the current block), let QLc ∈ QL denote the sequence of shared randomness
extracted in previous block and ALc denote the sequence of actions of team A played in
the current block. Players of team A produce their actions in the current block, ALc ,
only from the shared randomness QLc and their private randomness in the manner that
is described in details below. With team A playing Ac,t in the t-th stage of the current
block, player B gets the signal Sc,t constructed from Ac,t with the conditional distribution
pS|A.
For simplicity of the notation, the sequence of shared randomness, the actions of
team A, the actions of player B and the signals observed by player B are denoted by
QLc ,A
L
c , B
L
c , S
L
c for the current block (i-th block) and by Q
L
p ,A
L
p , B
L
p , S
L
p for the previous
block ((i − 1)-th block), where i ≥ 3. Similarly, the sequence of shared randomness, the
actions of team A, the actions of player B and the signals observed by player B in the
second block are denoted by QLs ,A
L
s , B
L
s , S
L
s . For the first block we use A
kL
f , B
kL
f and S
kL
f
to denote these random variables.
First block: In the first block, players of team A start off without any shared ran-
domness. They choose their actions independently and i.i.d. according to some p
(0)
A ∈ Π
satisfying H(A(0)|S(0)) > 0, where (A(0), S(0)) are some random variables with joint pmf
p
(0)
AS(a, s) = p
(0)
A (a)pS|A(s|a). Note that the distribution p(0)A with the above specifications
exists because player B does not have a perfect monitoring of the actions of the team
players. Furthermore, since p
(0)
A ∈ Π and the players of team A have access to private
randomness, they can implement it distributively. Thus,
pAkLf ,SkLf (a
kL
f , s
kL
f ) =
kL∏
t=1
p
(0)
A (af,t)pS|A(sf,t|af,t).
The length of the first block is kL, where L will be specified later; here k is a natural
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number satisfying
k >
H(Q|R)
H(A(0)|S(0)) . (16)
Second block: Equation (16) implies that kH(A(0)|S(0)) > H(Q|R). Therefore,
according to Proposition 12, for arbitrary  > 0, there exist mappings ϕL : AkL → QL
such that if we take QLs = ϕL(A
kL
f ), then, for sufficiently large L we have:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pQLs ,SkLf (qLs , skLf )− pSkLf (skLf )
dγLe∏
t=1
pQ|R(qs,t|0)
L∏
t=dγLe+1
pQ|R(qs,t|1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ . (17)
This implies that each of the players of team A can extract shared randomness QLs which is
almost independent of the observation of player B in the first block. Let H2,s = (S
kL
f , B
kl
f )
denote the history of observations of player B before starting the second block. Since
BkLf is produced locally by player B from S
kL
f , random variable B
kL
f is conditionally
independent of QLs given S
kL
f . Thus using the first property of total variation in Lemma 1
for random variables E = (SkLf , Q
L
s ) and F = B
kL
f we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pQLs ,H2,s(qLs , h2,s)− pH2,s(h2,s)
dγLe∏
t=1
pQ|R(qs,t|0)
L∏
t=dγLe+1
pQ|R(qs,t|1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ . (18)
In the second block, the players of team A (all of whom know QLs ) choose As,t with
distribution pAs,t|Qs,t = pA|Q from A, that is
pALs |QLs ,H2,s(a
L
s |qLs , h2,s) =
L∏
t=1
pA|Q(as,t|qs,t).
Because pA|Q ∈ Π, actions of players of team A are mutually independent given QLs and
they can realize it using private randomness. Player B gets signal Ss,t constructed from
As,t with the conditional distribution pS|A, i.e.,
pSLs |ALs ,QLs ,H2,s(s
L
s |aLs , qLs , h2,s) =
L∏
t=1
pS|A(ss,t|as,t).
In the i-th block for i ≥ 3: Let QLp ,ALp , BLp , SLp be the variables of the previous
block, i.e., the (i − 1)-th block. Note that QLp ,ALp is available to all players of team A.
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The idea is to construct the current block’s shared randomness QLc from (Q
L
p ,A
L
p ) of the
previous block. To do this, we need to find a suitable mapping ψL : QL × AL → QL
and set QLc = ψL(Q
L
p ,A
L
p ). Once the shared randomness Q
L
c is constructed in the current
block, players of team A construct their actions in the current block solely based on QLc
using the conditional distribution pAc,t|Qc,t = pA|Q as follows:
pALc |QLc (a
L
c |qLc ) =
L∏
t=1
pA|Q(ac,t|qc,t).
In other words, while players of team A observe the entire past history of the actions,
their actions in stage t of the current block depends only on Qc,t. As before, because
pA|Q ∈ Π, distributed implementation of this conditional distribution is feasible with the
private randomness of the team players.
Considering (18) as the induction basis, suppose that in the previous block ((i− 1)-th
block) we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pQLp ,H2,p(qLp , h2,p)− pH2,p(h2,p)
dγLe∏
t=1
pQ|R(qp,t|0)
L∏
t=dγLe+1
pQ|R(qp,t|1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ 3(i−3), (19)
where H2,p is the observation of player B before starting the previous block. Our first
goal is to identify an appropriate mapping ψL : QL × AL → QL to construct the shared
randomness of current block QLc such that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pQLc ,H2,c(qLc , h2,c)− pH2,c(h2,c)
dγLe∏
t=1
pQ|R(qc,t|0)
L∏
t=dγLe+1
pQ|R(qc,t|1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ 3(i−2), (20)
where H2,c = (H2,p, S
L
p , B
L
p ) is the observation of player B before starting the current
block.
Random variables ALp and S
L
p are produced in the previous block as follows:
pALp ,SLp |QLp (a
L
p , s
L
p |qLp ) =
L∏
t=1
pA|Q(ap,t|qp,t)pS|A(sp,t|ap,t).
Using the first property of total variation in Lemma 1 for E = (QLp ,H2,p) and F = (A
L
p , S
L
p )
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along with Equation (19) we obtain∥∥∥∥∥pQLp ,ALp ,SLp ,H2,p(qLp , aLp , sLp , h2,p)− pH2,p(h2,p)×
dγLe∏
t=1
pQAS|R(qp,t, ap,t, sp,t|0)
L∏
t=dγLe+1
pQAS|R(qp,t, ap,t, sp,t|1)
∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 3(i−3).
(21)
We use the following proposition which is a generalization of Proposition 12.
Proposition 17. Let (U,X, Y ) ∈ {0, 1} × X × Y and (V, Z) ∈ {0, 1} × Z be arbitrary
random variables with respective distributions pUXY and pV Z with finite supports such that
H(X|Y U) > H(Z|V ).
We also define random variables (X1, · · · , XL, Y1, · · · , YL,W ) with the joint distribution
pXLY LW such that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pXLY LW (xL, yL, w)− pW (w)
dpU (0)Le∏
t=1
pXY |U(xt, yt|0)
L∏
t=dpU (0)Le+1
pXY |U(xt, yt|1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ δ1.
Then, for arbitrary δ2 > 0, there exist mappings ψL : X L → ZL and natural number L¯
such that for all L ≥ L¯ and ZL = ψL(XL) we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pZLY LW (zL, yL, w)− pW (w)pY L(yL)
dpV (0)Le∏
t=1
pZ|V (zt|0)
L∏
t=dpV (0)Le+1
pZ|V (zt|1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ 2δ1+δ2.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 17 is provided in Section 6.2.
We use Proposition 17 with the choice of X = (Q,A), Y = S, U = R, Z = Q, V = R,
XL = (QLp ,A
L
p ), Y
L = SLp , Z
L = QLc and W = H2,p. The assumptions of Proposition 17
are satisfied by Equations (15) and (21). Therefore, we obtain that for sufficiently large
L, there exists a mapping ψL : QL ×AL → QL such that for QLc = ψL(QLp ,ALp ) we have∥∥∥∥∥∥pQLc ,SLp ,H2,p(qLc , sLp , h2,p)− pSLp (sLp )pH2,p(h2,p)
dγLe∏
t=1
pQ|R(qc,t|0)
L∏
t=dγLe+1
pQ|R(qc,t|1)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 2× 3(i−3)+  ≤ 3(i−2). (22)
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Since BLp is conditionally independent of Q
L
c given (H2,p, S
L
p ), using the first property of
total variation in Lemma 1 for E = (QLc , S
L
p ,H2,p) and F = B
L
p we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pQLc ,H2,c(qLc , h2,c)− pH2,c(h2,c)
dγLe∏
t=1
pQ|R(qc,t|0)
L∏
t=dγLe+1
pQ|R(qc,t|1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ 3(i−2), (23)
where we utilized the notation H2,c = (H2,p, S
L
p , B
L
p ). Therefore, by induction, Equation
(23) holds for arbitrary i ≥ 3.
Calculation of the payoff of the i-th block for i ≥ 2: Actions of team A and the
signals SLc were produced according to
pALc ,SLc |H2,c,QLc (a
L
c |h2,c, qLc ) =
L∏
t=1
pA|Q(ac,t|qc,t)pS|A(sc,t|ac,t).
Player B constructs his action Bc,t from the observations available to him at stage t of
the current block, that is
pBLc |H2,c,QLc ,ALc ,SLc (b
L
c |h2,c, qLc , aLc , sLc ) =
L∏
t=1
pBc,t|H2,c,St−1c ,Bt−1c (bc,t|h2,c, st−1c , bt−1c ).
Therefore, using the first property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables
E = (H2,c, Q
L
c ) and F = (A
L
c , B
L
c , S
L
c ) along with Equation (23), we obtain∥∥∥∥∥pQLc ,ALc ,SLc ,H2,c,BLc (qLc , aLc , sLc , h2,c, bLc )− pH2,c(h2,c)×
dγLe∏
t=1
pQ|R(qc,t|0)pA|Q(ac,t|qc,t)pS|A(sc,t|ac,t)pBc,t|H2,c,St−1c ,Bt−1c (bc,t|h2,c, st−1c , bt−1c )×
L∏
t=dγLe+1
pQ|R(qc,t|1)pA|Q(ac,t|qc,t)pS|A(sc,t|ac,t)pBc,t|H2,c,St−1c ,Bt−1c (bc,t|h2,c, st−1c , bt−1c )
∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 3(i−2).
Then, by using the second property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables
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E = (ALc , B
L
c ) and F = (Q
L
c ,H2,c, S
L
c ) and considering that i− 2 ≤ N we have∥∥∥∥∥pALc ,BLc (aLc , bLc )−
dγLe∏
t=1
pA|R(ac,t|0)pBc,t|At−1c ,Bt−1c (bc,t|at−1c , bt−1c )×
L∏
t=dγLe+1
pA|R(ac,t|1)pBc,t|At−1c ,Bt−1c (bc,t|at−1c , bt−1c )
∥∥∥∥∥
TV
≤ 3N. (24)
Note that by repeating the above arguments, (20) concludes that the inequality (24)
holds for the second block as well, i.e., substituting the subscripts ‘c‘ with ‘s‘, the in-
equality (24) still holds. Let M be the maximum absolute value of the payoff table. By
relating the total variation distance to the payoff, Equation (24) implies that the payoff
of team A at the second and the current block (in the i-th block for any i ≥ 2) is at most
in 2M3N distance of the payoff of team A when they played i.i.d. according to pA|R(a|0)
in γ portion of stages and according to pA|R(a|1) in the remaining 1−γ portion of stages.
Thus, it suffices to take N large enough so that the effect of the first block in the average
payoff of total stages is diminished, and then take  small enough (consequently take L
large enough such that Equations (17) and (22) are satisfied) to make 2M3N as small as
desired.
Remark 18. We have shown that fixing some k and N , for sufficiently large L, we can
achieve the desired payoff in T = L(k +N) stages. If T is not divisible by k +N , we can
make the first block slightly longer but because k + N  T for sufficiently large T , this
has negligible effect on the achieved payoff.
Remark 19. When player B monitors the actions of the team players imperfectly, we
showed that the team players can secure pi(A|R) for pRQAS satisfying (12), (13) and the
strict form of (14). For the boundary case when (14) holds with equality, namely when
H(QA|RS) = H(Q|R), the proof given above needs a slight modification: let ′ > 0 be an
arbitrarily small real number. We add to each block (other than the first block) another
subblock of length d′Le which we call “the shared randomness banking subblock”. In this
subblock, the team players play i.i.d. according to p
(0)
A , as they did in the first block. The
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remaining stages of the block is divided into two subblocks of lengths d(1 − ′)γLe and
L − d′Le − d(1 − ′)γLe, where the team players play i.i.d. according to pA|R(a|0) and
pA|R(a|1), respectively. To do so, the team players need (1− ′)H(Q|R) per stage shared
randomness, while they can distill ′H(A(0)|S(0)) + (1 − ′)H(AQ|SR) per stage shared
randomness. Note that since H(QA|RS) = H(Q|R) and H(A(0)|S(0)) > 0, the distilled
randomness is strictly more than the consumed randomness. Therefore, using a similar
argument as we utilized for the strict case of H(QA|RS) > H(Q|R), we can prove that
the team players can secure payoffs arbitrarily close to −′M+ (1− ′)pi(A|R). Since ′ is
arbitrary, we conclude that the team players can secure pi(A|R).
4.3. Proof of Theorem 15: Player B can defend w
Since we have given the solution expression in a different form than the one given by
Gossner and Tomala (2007), we adapt the proof of Gossner and Tomala (2007) to our
solution form.
In this subsection we assume that at the end of each stage t, the players of team
A in addition to At and Bt, observe the signal St. We show that even with the more
information available to players of team A, player B can still defend w. Let σ be an
arbitrary strategy for team A. We generate strategy τ for player B as follows: given ht2,
an arbitrary history of observations of player B until stage t, τt(h
t
2) is the best choice of
player B that minimizes the expected payoff at stage t, i.e.,
τt(h
t
2) ∈ arg min
b∈B
Eσ
[
uAt,b|Ht2 = ht2
]
,
where Eσ denotes the expectation with respect to the probability distribution induced by
σ. Let team A and player B play with respective strategies σ and τ and let AT , BT and
ST denote the sequence of actions and signals generated during the T stages of the game.
Define:
R = (I, BI−1, SI−1), Q = (I,AI−1, BI−1, SI−1), A˜ = AI and S˜ = SI ,
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where I is a uniformly distributed random variable on I = {1, 2, . . . , T} and independent
of (AT , BT , ST ). Random variable I is the so-called time sharing random variable. Note
that R is a function of Q. Therefore,
pS˜,A˜,R,Q(s, a, r, q) = pRQ(r, q)pA˜|Q(a|q)pS|A(s|a).
Since the action profile At is implemented distributively by conditioning on (A
t−1, Bt−1, St−1),
the conditional distribution pA˜|Q(a|q) belongs to Π, i.e., pA˜|Q(a|q) ∈ Π. Next, we need to
show that H(QA˜|S˜R) ≥ H(Q|R). Note that
H(QA˜|S˜R)−H(Q|R) = H(A˜S˜|QR)−H(S˜|R). (25)
The inequality H(A˜S˜|QR)−H(S˜|R) ≥ 0 follows from
H(A˜S˜|QR)−H(S˜|R) = H(AISI |I,AI−1, BI−1, SI−1)−H(SI |I, BI−1, SI−1)
=
T∑
t=1
1
T
(
H(At, St|At−1, Bt−1, St−1)−H(St|Bt−1, St−1)
)
(26)
=
T∑
t=1
1
T
(
H(At|Bt, St)−H(At−1|Bt−1, St−1)) (27)
=
1
T
H(AT |BT , ST ) ≥ 0,
where (26) follows from the fact that I is uniform and independent of (AT , BT , ST ), and
(27) follows from
H(At|Bt, St)−H(At−1|Bt−1, St−1)
= H(At−1|Bt, St) +H(At|Bt, St,At−1)−H(At−1|Bt−1, St−1)
= H(At−1, Bt, St|Bt−1, St−1)−H(Bt, St|Bt−1, St−1) +H(At, Bt, St|At−1, Bt−1, St−1)
−H(Bt, St|At−1, Bt−1, St−1)−H(At−1|Bt−1, St−1)
= H(At, Bt, St|At−1, Bt−1, St−1)−H(Bt, St|Bt−1, St−1)
= H(At, St|At−1, Bt−1, St−1)−H(St|Bt−1, St−1) +H(Bt|At, Bt−1, St)−H(Bt|Bt−1, St)
= H(At, St|At−1, Bt−1, St−1)−H(St|Bt−1, St−1), (28)
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where (28) holds because the random variable Bt is conditionally independent of (A
t, St)
given (Bt−1, St−1).
Now we relate the payoff of σ and τ to R and A˜ :
λT (σ, τ) =
T∑
t=1
1
T
∑
bt−1,st−1
pBt−1,St−1(b
t−1, st−1) min
b∈B
E
[
uAt,b|Bt−1 = bt−1, St−1 = st−1
]
=
∑
r
pR(r) min
b∈B
E
[
uA˜,b|R = r
]
= pi(A˜|R). (29)
We have identified random variables (R,Q, A˜, S˜) satisfying the constraints of the problem,
except for the cardinality bounds on R and Q. Cardinality of R and Q can be reduced
using the standard arguments such as the support lemma of (El Gamal and Kim, 2011,
Appendix C) or the Fenchel-Bunt extension to the Caratheodory’s theorem. We leave the
argument on the reduction of the cardinality of R and Q to Proposition 20. According
to Proposition 20, given the random variables (R,Q, A˜, S˜) satisfying the constraints of
the problem except for the cardinality bounds on R and Q, we can identify other random
variables (R′, Q′,A′, S ′) such that they satisfy all the constraints of the problem.
Proposition 20. Let A ∈ A, S ∈ S, R ∈ R and Q ∈ Q have a joint distribution
satisfying Equations (12)-(14) along with
pi(A|R) ≥ β, (30)
whereR and Q are finite sets with arbitrary cardinalities and β is an arbitrary real number.
There exist random variables A′ ∈ A, S ′ ∈ S, R′ ∈ R′ and Q′ ∈ Q′ such that |R′| = 2,
|Q′| = 2|A| and the joint distribution on (A′, S ′, R′, Q′) satisfies Equations (12)-(14) and
(30).
The proof of Proposition 20 is provided in Appendix B.
5. Computation of min-entropy function
Consider a one-shot zero-sum game between players Alice (maximizer) and Bob (min-
imizer) and let J (h) be the maximum expected payoff that Alice can secure (regardless
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of what Bob plays) by playing mixed actions of entropy at most h (as defined in Equa-
tion (2)). As stated in Theorems 3 and 9, J (h) characterizes the maxmin values of the
repeated game with bounded entropy (Section 3.1) and the repeated game with leaked
randomness (Section 3.3). The main goal of this section is to study the computational
aspects of J (h).
Let F (w) denote the inverse function of J (h). F (w) is the minimum entropy that Alice
needs to secure payoff w; thus, we call it the min-entropy function. To compute F (w),
one has to minimize the concave function of entropy over the polytope of mixed actions
that secure payoff w for Alice. The problem of entropy minimization over a polytope is a
standard problem and is known to be NP-hard (see Kovacˇevic´ et al. (2012)). Thus, the
computation of F (w) (or J (h)) is NP-hard. In this section, we study J (h) thorough its
inverse, F (w), and provide some computationally efficient upper and lower bounds for it.
5.1. Problem statement
Consider a zero-sum game between players Alice (A) and Bob (B) with respective pure
strategies sets A = {1, . . . , n} and B = {1, . . . , n′}, where n and n′ are natural numbers.
The payoff matrix is denoted by U = [ui,j], where ui,j is the real valued payoff that player
A gets from player B when i ∈ A and j ∈ B are played. Player A (player B) wishes to
maximize (minimize) the expected payoff. The set of all randomized strategies of players
A and B are denoted by ∆(A) and ∆(B) respectively, which are the probability simplexes
on sample spaces A and B respectively. Thus, Alice’s strategy corresponds to a pmf
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn), which can be also illustrated as a column vector with non-negative
entries that add up to one.
Assume that player A uses randomized strategy p. Then, the payoff of Alice if Bob
plays j ∈ B is ∑i piui,j. We say that Alice secures payoff w with randomized strategy p
(regardless of the action of player B) if
∑
i piui,j ≥ w for all j ∈ B. Thus, the set of all
distributions that guarantee payoff w for player A can be expressed as
PU(w) = {p ∈ ∆(A) : pTU ≥ w1T}, (31)
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where pT is the transpose of the column vector p, 1 is a column vector of all ones and
v1 ≥ v2 means any element of v1 is greater than or equal to the corresponding element
at v2.
We define
FU(w) , min
p∈PU(w)
H(p). (32)
If the set PU(w) is empty, we set FU(w) = +∞.
A remark on notation: Two-player zero-sum games are completely characterized
by their payoff matrix. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, we will call two-player zero-sum
games with their payoff matrix. Thus, game U refers to a game with payoff table U.
Definition 21. Given a game U = [ui,j], parameters m, m, v and w
∗ are defined as:
• m (m) is the minimum (maximum) element of matrix U : m = mini,j ui,j (m =
maxi,j ui,j).
• v is the maximum payoff secured by pure actions ( pure-strategy security level):
v = maxi minj ui,j.
• w∗ is the value of the game U, which is the maximum guaranteed payoff with unlimited
access to random sources:
w∗ = max
w: PU(w)6=∅
w. (33)
Note that by definition, m ≤ v ≤ w∗ ≤ m.
According to Definition 21, v is the payoff that is guaranteed without consumption of
any randomness, whereas w∗ is the maximum guaranteed payoff when unlimited random-
ness is available. Thus, it is interesting to consider the min-entropy function FU(w) in the
domain v ≤ w ≤ w∗. If w ≤ v, then FU(w) = 0; if w > w∗ the feasible set of optimization
problem in 32 is empty and FU(w) = +∞. When v ≤ w ≤ w∗, the function FU(w) is not
necessarily convex or concave as a function of w: it is strictly increasing and piecewise
concave (Neyman and Okada, 2000, p. 241). 2
2This property is stated in Neyman and Okada (2000) in terms of the function J(·).
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∆(A)
PU(w1)
PcU(w2)
Figure 2: Illustration of PU(w1), PcU (w2) and ∆(A)
5.2. On the set PU(w)
The function FU(w) is defined in (32) using PU(w), the set of all distributions that
guarantee a security level w for player A. Observe that
PU(w) = {p ∈ ∆(A) : pTU ≥ w1T} (34)
is a polytope defined via some linear constraints. As the matrix U is completely arbitrary,
with a change of variables, one can convert it to many different equivalent polytopes.
We only need to study PU(w) for v ≤ w ≤ w∗. It is immediate from the definition of
PU(w) that this set is decreasing in w, i.e., for any w1 ≥ w2,
PU(w1) ⊆ PU(w2). (35)
We are interested to see if the inclusion in (35) is strict, and if yes, quantify to what extent
it is. To do this, we look at the distance between the set PU(w1) and the compliment of
PU(w2) (that is PcU(w2) = ∆(A) − PU(w2)). The sets PU(w1), PcU(w2) and ∆(A) are
illustrated in Figure 2. The distance between any two sets can be defined as
d(S1,S2) , inf
p∈S1,q∈S2
d(p,q),
where d(p,q) can be any arbitrary distance measure. The standard option is the total
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variation distance
d1(p,q) =
1
2
∑
i
|pi − qi|.
With this choice of the distance, we have
Theorem 22. For any w1 and w2 satisfying v ≤ w2 ≤ w1 ≤ w∗, we have
d1(PcU(w2),PU(w1)) ≥
|w1 − w2|
|m−m| .
Observe that the quantities m and m can be simply computed from U. The idea of
the proof of Theorem 22 is standard (e.g., see (Gossner and Vieille, 2002, eq. (4)) for a
similar derivation), but is included in Section 6.3 for completeness.
In this paper, we propose the use of the Re´nyi divergence of order two between p and
q to quantify the distance between two distributions:3
d2(p,q) , log(
∑
i
p2i
qi
) = log(1 + χ2(p,q)).
Our first result gives the following bound:
Theorem 23. For any w1, w2 satisfying v ≤ w2 ≤ w1 ≤ w∗, we have
d2(PcU(w2),PU(w1)) ≥ log
(
1 +
(w1 − w2)2
(w1 −m)(m− w1)
)
.
The proof can be found in Section 6.3. The above result is derived by a probabilistic
approach, which we believe is novel in the context of linear programming.
Our second result is less crucial, but still useful. It gives a compact formula for the
supporting hyperplanes of PU(w) in terms of the Nash equilibrium of a game. We need a
definition:
Definition 24. Val(U) denotes the value of a two-player zero-sum game with payoff table
U = [ui,j].
3In this definition, we set p2i /qi to be zero if pi = qi = 0, and infinity if pi > 0 while qi = 0. We have
that d2(p,q) ≥ 0, and d2(p,q) = 0 if and only if p = q.
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Val(U) is the maximum value that Alice can guarantee using arbitrary mixed strategies.
It is known that in a zero-sum game, while the game might have multiple Nash equilibria,
the value of Alice in all of the equilibria is the same (See e.g., Narahari (2014), p.145).
Given values a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ R, let us construct a new table whose (i, j) entry is
u˜ij = ui,j + ai. In other words, we add ai to the entries in the i-th row of U. The new
table can be expressed as U˜ = U + a · 1T , where a is a column vector whose entries are
a1, a2, . . . , an and 1
T is a row vector of all ones. Observe that the table U˜ can be intuitively
understood as giving an additional incentive ai to Alice for playing her i-th action (it is
actually a disincentive or “tax” if ai < 0).
Theorem 25. The set PU(w) can be characterized as follows:
PU(w) =
{
p ∈ ∆(A)
∣∣∣∑
i
aipi ≤ Val(U + a1T )− w, ∀a
}
.
Remark 26. Note that maxp∈PU(w) (
∑
i aipi) is simply a linear program. The Equivalence
of linear program and Nash equilibria is known in the literature (Dantzig (1951); Adler
(2013)). However, our construction of the game U˜ based on incentive or tax is new to best
of our knowledge.
In Section 6.4, we give the proof of Theorem 25 as well as a geometric picture of the
Nash equilibrium strategies of Alice.
5.2.1. On the min-entropy function
We begin with a property of the min-entropy function. To state the property, we need
the following definition:
Definition 27. Consider two games with payoff matrixes U1 and U2. Let U3 = U1 ⊕ U2 be
the direct-sum of U1 and U2. U3 defines a new game in which players simultaneously play
one instance of U1 and one instance of U2 and the resulting payoff is the sum of payoffs
from U1 and U2.
Theorem 28. For every game U, FU⊕U(w) = FU(w/2). Similarly, for every natural number
k, F⊕kU(w) = FU(w/k), where ⊕kU is k times direct sum of U.
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Proof of Theorem 28 is provided in Section 6.5.
An application of the above theorem is that given an expression GU(w) that bounds
FU(w) from below for all w and U, we can conclude that G⊕kU(kw) ≤ F⊕kU(kw) = FU(w).
Thus, maxkG⊕kU(kw) is also a (potentially better) lower bound to FU(w). As a result, we
expect that a “good” lower (or upper bound) on FU(w) should have the correct scaling
behavior as we simultaneously play more and more copies of the game.
5.3. Lower and upper bounds on the min-entropy function
The min-entropy function FU(w) in (32) is the minimum of a concave function on a
polytope PU(w). This minimum occurs at a vertex of PU(w). This leads to a search in the
exponentially large set of vertexes of the polytope PU(w), which is computationally hard.
We desire to find bounds on FU(w) that are either explicit, or else can be computed in
polynomial time. Observe that
FU(w) = min
p∈PU(w)
H(p) = log(|A|)− max
p∈PU(w)
D(p‖pu), (36)
where pu is the uniform distribution over A, and D(p‖q) = ∑i pi log(pi/qi) is the
Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence. Thus, we are interested in finding the vertex of PU(w)
which has maximum distance from the uniform distribution (with respect to KL diver-
gence).
Lower bound: To prove lower bounds for
FU(w) = min
p∈PU(w)
H(p), (37)
one idea is to replace the entropy function with a smaller function and compute the
minimum over PU(w). The second idea is to minimize the min-entropy function FU(w)
over all payoff tables with given properties such as m, m and v. Another idea is to relax
the set of distributions PU(w) and replace it with a potentially bigger set. We proceed
with the first idea, then elaborate on the second idea and finally comment on the third
idea.
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Using the fact that the Re´nyi entropy is decreasing in its order, we obtain that for any
α > 1,
FU(w) = min
p∈PU(w)
H(p) ≥ min
p∈PU(w)
Hα(p), (38)
where Hα(p) is the Re´nyi entropy of order α:
Hα(p) =
1
1− α log2
(∑
i
pαi
)
.
The case of α = 2 is related to the Euclidean norm and results in an optimization problem
similar to the one given in (36) for the Euclidean norm instead of the KL divergence, which
is still not tractable. However, the case α =∞ relates to the maximum norm and results
in the following lower bound:
G
(1)
U (w) = − log2
(
max
i∈A
max
p∈PU(w)
pi
)
.
For each i, the problem of finding the maximum of pi over p ∈ PU(w) is a linear program.
From Theorem 25, we can find an upper bound on the value of this linear program,
yielding
G
(1)
U (w) ≥ − log2 max
i
(
Val(U + ei1
T )− w) , (39)
where ei is a vector of length |A| = n whose i-th coordinate is one, and all its other
coordinates are zero. The lower bound G
(1)
U (w) or its relaxed version in (39) can be found
in polynomial time, even though they are not in explicit forms.
To obtain an explicit lower bound, observe that log2(1/pi) = d2(ei,p). Note that the
vector ei is a probability vector associated to a deterministic random variable that chooses
i with probability one. Take some  > 0. By definition, deterministic strategies cannot
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secure a payoff of more than v. Hence, ei ∈ PcU(v + ), so we have
G
(1)
U (w) = − log2
(
max
p∈PU(w)
max
i∈A
pi
)
= min
p∈PU(w)
min
i∈A
log2(
1
pi
)
= min
p∈PU(w)
min
i∈A
d2(ei,p)
≥ min
p∈PU(w)
min
q∈P cU (v+)
d2(q,p)
≥ log2
(
1 +
(w − v − )2
(w −m)(m− w)
)
, (40)
where (40) follows from Theorem 23. Letting → 0, we obtain
FU(w) ≥ G(2)U (w) , log2
(
1 +
(w − v)2
(w −m)(m− w)
)
∀w : v ≤ w ≤ w∗.
With a similar argument and using Theorem 22 along with the fact that pi = 1 −
d1(ei,p), we obtain the following lower bound:
FU(w) ≥ G(3)U (w) , − log2
(
1− w − v
m−m
)
∀w : v ≤ w ≤ w∗.
Observe that when v = m, G
(2)
U (w) equals G
(3)
U (w). When v 6= m, a simple calculation
shows that G
(2)
U (w) ≥ G(3)U (w) if and only if w ≥ (m+ v)/2.
Example 29. Consider a game with payoff matrix:
U =

−1 1 1
1 0.5 1
1 1 0.5
 .
From the payoff matrix we have v = .5, m = −1, m = 1 and w∗ = 0.778. Therefore, for
w ≥ 0.75, G(2)U (w) gives a better lower bound than G(3)U (w) on FU(w).
Remark 30. One can inspect that just like the min-entropy function, the explicit lower
bounds G
(2)
U (w) and G
(3)
U (w) satisfy
G
(i)
U⊕U(w) = G
(i)
U (w/2), i = 2, 3,
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thus, have the correct scaling behavior. Additionally, by replacing entropy with Re´nyi
entropy in the proof of Theorem 28, one also obtains that
G
(1)
U⊕U(w) = G
(1)
U (w/2).
The function G
(2)
U (w) has second derivative for all v ≤ w ≤ w∗, while the second
derivative of the piecewise concave function FU(w) is defined everywhere except for a finite
number of kink points. The second derivative of the function G
(2)
U (w) may be positive or
negative, while FU(w) is piecewise concave. On the other hand, the function G
(1)
U (w)
is piecewise convex. The reason is that if maxi∈Amaxp∈PU(w) pi is attained by i
∗ and a
particular vertex of PU(w) for w ∈ [w1, w2], in this interval maxi∈Amaxp∈PU(w) pi varies
linearly in w. Then, convexity of − log2(·) results in convexity of G(1)U (w) in the interval
[w1, w2].
Remark 31. Inequality (40) shows that
max
p∈PU(w)
pi ≤
(
1 +
(w − v)2
(w −m)(m− w)
)−1
∀w : v ≤ w ≤ w∗and ∀i = 1, . . . , n, (41)
which gives an upper bound for the linear programming of maxp∈PU(w) pi. Note that PU(w)
is a very generic polytope, parameterized by a variable w. By a change of variables (scaling
and shifting), one can convert maxp∈PU(w) pi to a wide class of linear programs (with no
immediate connection to the probability simplex), and then use the bound given in (41).
Let m, m and v be the minimum entry, maximum entry and pure strategy security
level of the payoff table U. The lower bounds G
(2)
U (w) and G
(3)
U (w), just rely on the
parameters m, m and v. We seek to answer the following question: given that we just
know the parameters m, m and v from payoff table U, what is the tightest lower bound for
the min-entropy function? To compute the tightest lower bound it suffices to minimize
the min-entropy function over all payoff tables (of arbitrary size) with parameters m, m
and v. Let denote this lower bound by G
(4)
U (w), then,
G
(4)
U (w) = min
U′
min
p∈PU′ (w)
H(p), (42)
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where the first minimization is computed over all payoff tables U′ (of arbitrary size) with
minimum entry m, maximum entry m and pure-strategy security level v. We simplify the
expression of Equation (42) in the following theorem:
Theorem 32. Let m, m,v and w be some known real numbers such that m ≤ v ≤ w ≤ m.
We have
G
(4)
U (w) = min
U′
min
p∈PU′ (w)
H(p) = −
⌊
m− v
m− w
⌋
m− w
m− v log
(
m− w
m− v
)
−(
1−
⌊
m− v
m− w
⌋
m− w
m− v
)
log
(
1−
⌊
m− v
m− w
⌋
m− w
m− v
)
,
where the first minimization is computed over all payoff tables U′ (of arbitrary size) with
minimum entry m, maximum entry m and pure-strategy security level v, and bac is the
greatest integer smaller than or equal to a.
The proof of the above theorem is provided in Section 6.6. Theorem 32 gives another
explicit form lower bound for the min-entropy function which is optimal in the sense
that it is the tightest lower bound that utilizes just the information of minimum entry,
maximum entry and pure-strategy security level of the payoff table.
Remark 33. The bound G
(4)
U (w) does not depend on the minimum entry m. This is
because in the minimization problem of Equation (42), we do not restrict the dimension
of the payoff table. The key observation is as follows: given a table U with maximum entry
m and pure-strategy security level v, construct another payoff table U′ as follows: first,
replace with v the entries of U that have values less than v. Then, add a new row of all
ms to the resulting payoff table. Consider that U′ still has pure strategy security level of v
and maximum entry of m. Furthermore, any strategy that guarantees payoff w in game U
also guarantees payoff w in game U′.
Let us now turn to the third idea to prove a lower bound for FU(w) in (37), namely
replacing the set of distributions PU(w) with a potentially bigger set. As mentioned earlier,
minimization of the entropy over the set
PU(w) = {p ∈ ∆(A) : pTU ≥ w1T}
45
can be difficult. However, it could be possible to solve it (or find good lower bounds for
it) for special choices of the matrix U.4 We show how a result for an special case of U can
be utilized to find a bound (computable in polynomial time) for an arbitrary U. Assume
that we have a way to minimize entropy over the set
Q(r) , {p ∈ ∆(A) : pTU∗ ≥ rT}
for some given matrix U∗, and any arbitrary column vector r. We are interested in a value
for r such that
PU(w) ⊆ Q(r). (43)
We can relax the minimization of the entropy over the set PU(w) by computing its min-
imum over the bigger set of Q(r). Note that an appropriate r in (43) can be found by
solving a number of linear programs: the product pTU∗ consists of a number of linear
functions of coordinates of p, and the minimum of each linear function over the set PU(w)
is a linear program (see also Theorem 25).
Upper bound: It is clear that FU(w) ≤ H(p) for any arbitrary choice of p ∈ PU(w).
The following theorem gives a number of upper bounds each of which are obtained by
identifying p ∈ PU(w) in different ways.
Theorem 34. Consider a game with payoff matrix U and parameters v, m, m and w∗
defined in Definition 21. Let h∗ be the entropy of a Nash strategy of player A. Define
Q
(1)
U (w) = min
{
h∗,
w − v
w∗ − vh
∗ + h
(
w − v
w∗ − v
)}
,
Q
(2)
U (w) = min
i∈A
H(p∗max,i), p
∗
max,i ∈ arg max
p∈P(w)
pi,
Q
(3)
U (w) = min
j∈B
max
p∈PU(w):
∑
i∈A piui,j=w
H(p),
where h(α) = −α log(α)− (1− α) log(1− α) and Q(2)U (w) can be defined with any choice
4For instance, if each row of U has only one non-zero element, the set of constraints will be on the
individual coordinates of the vector p and minimizing entropy for such constraints is tractable.
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of p∗max,i from the argmax set (if there are multiple possible choices). We have
FU(w) ≤ Q(r)U (w), r = 1, 2, 3.
Proof of Theorem 34 can be found in Section 6.7.
Remark 35. The second derivative of Q
(1)
U (w) is negative for v ≤ w ≤ w∗. Thus, Q(1)U (w)
is a concave function of w and one can readily inspect that:
Q
(1)
U⊕U(w) = Q
(1)
U (
w
2
).
As arg maxp∈P(w) pi may contain multiple elements, Q
(2)
U (w) is not a well defined function
of w. The function Q
(3)
U (w) is not necessarily scalable for game U⊕ U.
Example 36. Consider two games with the following payoff tables:
U =

3 1 0 −2 0 −2
1 3 −2 0 −2 0
0 −2 3 1 0 −2
−2 0 1 3 −2 0
0 −2 0 −2 3 1
−2 0 −2 0 1 3

, U′ =

0 1 1 .5
1 0 .5 1
1 .5 0 1
.5 1 1 0
 .
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the behavior of the bounds for the games U and U′, respectively.
In this examples, since v = m, G
(3)
U (w) coincides with G
(2)
U (w), thus, it has not been
depicted in the figures.
6. Proofs
6.1. Proof of Proposition 12
To prove Proposition 12 we make use of Lemmas 37 and 6. A brief discussion on
randomness extraction and proof of Lemma 37 is provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the bounds on the min-entropy function for the game U defined in Example 36.
The horizontal line depicts w and vertical line depicts the value of bounds.
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Lemma 37. Consider the correlated random sequences XLp and Y
L
p drawn i.i.d. from re-
spective spaces X and Y by joint probability distribution pXY . Let Q(L) be a random vari-
able independent of Y Lp and uniformly distributed on {1, 2, . . . , 2RL}, where R < H(X|Y )
is a real number; then, there exist mappings BL : X L → {1, 2, . . . , 2RL} such that
lim
L→∞
‖pBL(XLp )Y Lp − pQ(L)Y Lp ‖TV = 0.
Choose a real number R such that γH(p
(1)
A ) + (1− γ)H(p(2)A ) < R < H(X|Y ) and LR
is a natural number (for a sufficiently large L).
We define random variables Q(L) and AˆL that are mutually independent of each other
and of Y Lp with the following marginal distributions: let Q
(L) be a uniformly distributed
random variable on {1, 2, . . . , 2RL} and AˆL be distributed as follows:
pAˆL(a
L) =
dγLe∏
t=1
p
(1)
A (at)
L∏
t=dγL)e+1
p
(2)
A (at).
Note that R < H(X|Y ); thus, according to Lemma 37, there exist mappings BL : X L →
{1, 2, . . . , 2RL} satisfying
lim
L→∞
‖pBL(XLp )Y Lp − pQ(L)Y Lp ‖TV = 0. (44)
On the other hand, we have
p- lim sup
L→∞
1
L
log
1
pAˆL(Aˆ
L)
= γH(p
(1)
A ) + (1− γ)H(p(2)A )
< R = p- lim inf
L→∞
1
L
log
1
pQL(QL)
.
Therefore, according to Lemma 6, there exist mappings ϕL : {1, 2, . . . , 2RL} → AL such
that
lim
L→∞
‖pϕL(Q(L)) − pAˆL‖TV = 0.
Considering the fact that ϕL(Q
(L)) and AˆL both are independent of Y Lp , the above equation
along with the third property of the total variation distance in Lemma 1 results in
lim
L→∞
‖pϕL(Q(L))Y Lp − pAˆLY Lp ‖TV = 0. (45)
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Furthermore, note that
‖pϕL(BL(XLp ))Y Lp − pAˆLY Lp ‖TV ≤ ‖pϕL(BL(XLp ))Y Lp − pϕL(Q(L))Y Lp ‖TV + ‖pϕL(Q(L))Y Lp − pAˆLY Lp ‖TV
≤ ‖pBL(XLp )Y Lp − pQ(L)Y Lp ‖TV + ‖pϕL(Q(L))Y Lp − pAˆLY Lp ‖TV ,
(46)
where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality for the total variation dis-
tance, and the second inequality follows from the fourth property of total variation in
Lemma 1. Let ALc = ψL(X
L
p ) = ϕL
(
BL
(
XLp
))
. Then, by combining Equations (44), (45)
and (46), we have
lim
L→∞
‖pALc Y Lp − pAˆLY Lp ‖TV = 0. (47)
Thus, ψL(·) = ϕL(BL(·)) is the desired mapping.
6.2. Proof of Proposition 17
Choose real numbers R1 and R2 such that
R1 < H(X|Y, U = 0), R2 < H(X|Y, U = 1), pU(0)R1 + pU(1)R2 > H(Z|V ),
and for sufficiently large L, dpU(0)LeR1 and dpU(1)LeR2 are natural numbers. Since
H(X|Y U) = pU(0)H(X|Y, U = 0) + pU(1)H(X|Y, U = 1) > H(Z|V ),
real numbers R1 and R2 with the above properties exist.
Let Lˆ = dpU(0)Le and L˜ = L− dpU(0)Le. Observe that L = Lˆ+ L˜. We will consider
three sets of random variables:
• (Set 1): Random variables (X1, · · · , XL, Y1, · · · , YL,W ) defined in the statement of
the proposition with the joint distribution pXLY LW satisfying∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣pXLY LW (xL, yL, w)− pW (w)
Lˆ∏
t=1
pXY |U(xt, yt|0)
L∏
t=Lˆ+1
pXY |U(xt, yt|1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
TV
≤ δ1.
(48)
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• (Set 2): Mutually independent random variables W ′, (Xˆ Lˆ, Yˆ Lˆ) and (X˜ L˜, Y˜ L˜). Here
pW ′ = pW . Furthermore, (Xˆ
Lˆ, Yˆ Lˆ) and (X˜ L˜, Y˜ L˜) are i.i.d. according to pXY |U(xˆ, yˆ|0)
and pXY |U(x˜, y˜|1), respectively. In other words, for X ′L = (Xˆ Lˆ, X˜ L˜) and Y ′L =
(Yˆ Lˆ, Y˜ L˜) we have,
pX′LY ′L(x
L, yL) =
Lˆ∏
t=1
pXY |U(xt, yt|0)
L∏
t=Lˆ+1
pXY |U(xt, yt|1).
Equation (48) along with the above equation and pW ′ = pW shows that the random
variables in Set 2 are related to the random variables in Set 1 as follows:
‖pXLY LW − pX′LY ′LpW ′‖TV ≤ δ1. (49)
• (Set 3): Two independent random variables Qˆ(Lˆ) and Q˜(L˜) with uniform distributions
on {1, 2, . . . , 2LˆR1} and {1, 2, . . . , 2L˜R2}, respectively.
Since R1 < H(X|Y, U = 0) and R2 < H(X|Y, U = 1), according to Lemma 37, for
arbitrary δ′ > 0, there exist mappings BˆLˆ : X Lˆ → {1, 2, . . . , 2R1Lˆ} and B˜L˜ : X L˜ →
{1, 2, . . . , 2R2L˜} satisfying
‖pBˆLˆ(XˆLˆ)Yˆ Lˆ − pQˆ(Lˆ)pYˆ Lˆ‖TV ≤ δ
′, ‖pB˜L˜(X˜L˜)Y˜ L˜ − pQ˜(L˜)pY˜ L˜‖TV ≤ δ
′, (50)
for sufficiently large Lˆ and L˜. Next, letQ(L) = (Qˆ(Lˆ), Q˜(L˜)), and BL : X L → {1, 2, . . . , 2R1Lˆ+R2L˜}
be the mapping BL(Xˆ
Lˆ, X˜ L˜) = (BˆLˆ(Xˆ
Lˆ), B˜L˜(X˜
L˜)). Using Equation (50), independence
of (Xˆ Lˆ, Yˆ Lˆ) from (X˜ L˜, Y˜ L˜), and independence of Qˆ(Lˆ) from Q˜(L˜), we have
‖pBL(XˆLˆ,X˜L˜)Yˆ LˆY˜ L˜ − pQ(L)pYˆ LˆpY˜ L˜‖TV ≤ 2δ′,
where we used the third property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables E1 =
(BˆLˆ(Xˆ
Lˆ), Yˆ Lˆ), F1 = (B˜L˜(X˜
L˜), Y˜ L˜), E2 = (Qˆ
(Lˆ), Yˆ Lˆ) and F2 = (Q˜
(L˜), Y˜ L˜). Then, using the
fifth property of total variation in Lemma 1 for random variables E1 = (BL(Xˆ
Lˆ, X˜ L˜), Yˆ Lˆ, Y˜ L˜),
E2 = (Q
(L), Yˆ Lˆ, Y˜ L˜) and F = W ′, we get
‖pW ′pBL(XˆLˆ,X˜L˜)Yˆ LˆY˜ L˜ − pW ′pQ(L)pYˆ LˆpY˜ L˜‖TV ≤ 2δ′.
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Furthermore, by using the notation X ′L = (Xˆ Lˆ, X˜ L˜) and Y ′L = (Yˆ Lˆ, Y˜ L˜), the above
inequality is simplified as follows:
‖pW ′pBL(X′L)Y ′L − pW ′pQ(L)pY ′L‖TV ≤ 2δ′. (51)
The above inequality shows that the mapping BL simulates random variable Q
(L) (in Set
3 of random variables) from X ′L (in Set 2 of random variables) within the total variation
distance of 2δ′. Now, we consider the Set 1 of random variables. By applying the mapping
BL on sequence X
L we have that
‖pWBL(XL)Y L − pWpQ(L)pY L‖TV ≤ ‖pWBL(XL)Y L − pW ′pBL(X′L)Y ′L‖TV +
‖pW ′pBL(X′L)Y ′L − pW ′pQ(L)pY ′L‖TV +
‖pW ′pQ(L)pY ′L − pWpQ(L)pY L‖TV
≤ 2δ1 + 2δ′, (52)
where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality for the total variation dis-
tance, and the second inequality results from Equation (51) and the following two facts:
• ‖pWBL(XL)Y L − pW ′pBL(X′L)Y ′L‖TV ≤ δ1. This is a consequence of Equation (49),
combined with the fourth property of the total variation distance in Lemma 1.
• ‖pW ′pQ(L)pY ′L−pWpQ(L)pY L‖TV ≤ δ1. To see that this inequality is correct, first, note
that Equation (49) along with the second property of total variation in Lemma 1
implies that Y L is in δ1 distance of Y
′L. Then, the fact that pW ′ = pW along with
the fifth property of total variation in Lemma 1 gives the desired inequality.
Now, Let ZˆL be an ideal sequence with distribution
pZˆL(zˆ
L) =
dpV (0)Le∏
t=1
pZ|V (zˆt|0)
L∏
t=dpV (0)Le+1
pZ|V (zˆt|1).
Then, we have
p- lim sup
L→∞
1
L
log
1
pZˆL(Zˆ
L)
= H(Z|V )
< pU(0)R1 + pU(1)R2 = p- lim inf
L→∞
1
L
log
1
pQL(QL)
.
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Therefore, according to Lemma 6, there exist mappings ϕL : {1, 2, . . . , 2R1Lˆ+R2L˜} → ZL
such that for sufficiently large L
‖pϕL(Q(L)) − pZˆL‖TV ≤ δ′. (53)
Next, by replacing pE1 , pE2 and pF with respective distributions pϕL(Q(L)), pZˆL and pWpY L ,
the fifth property of total variation in Lemma 1 along with Equation (53) implies
‖pϕL(Q(L))pY LpW − pZˆLpY LpW‖TV ≤ δ′. (54)
Thus we have
‖pϕL(BL(XL))Y LW − pZˆLpY LpW‖TV ≤ ‖pϕL(BL(XL))Y LW − pϕL(Q(L))pY LpW‖TV +
‖pϕL(Q(L))pY LpW − pZˆLpY LpW‖TV
≤ ‖pBL(XL)Y LW − pQ(L)pY LpW‖TV + δ′
≤ 2δ1 + 3δ′, (55)
where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality for the total variation dis-
tance; the second inequality is a consequent of Equation (54) and the fourth property
of total variation in Lemma 1 where E1 and E2 are replaced with BL(X
L)Y LW and
Q(L)Y LW , respectively; finally, the third inequality results from Equation (52).
Let ZL = ϕL
(
BL(X
L)
)
and take δ′ small enough that 3δ′ ≤ δ2. Then, from Equa-
tion (55) we have
‖pZLY LW − pZˆLpY LpW‖TV ≤ 2δ1 + δ2,
and the proof is complete.
6.3. Proof of Theorems 22 and 23
Take arbitrary p ∈ PcU(w2) and q ∈ PU(w1). Since p ∈ PcU(w2), when Alice plays
according to p, Bob has a (pure) strategy j ∈ B that reduces Alice’s expected payoff
to a number less than w2. We can define a random variable W˜ that represents the
payoff of Alice when Alice plays p and Bob plays j. Then, the alphabet set of W˜ is
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{u1,j, u2,j, . . . , un,j}, and its probability distribution over this set is p. We must have
E[W˜ ] < w2.
Let us assume that Alice adopts q, but Bob keeps playing the same j ∈ B. Let W be
the random variable describing the payoff of Alice when she plays according to q. Because
q ∈ PU(w1), E[W ] ≥ w1. We can think of W as taking ui,j with probability qi.
Theorem 22 follows from the following chain of inequalities:
|w1 − w2| ≤ |E[W ]− E[W˜ ]|
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
(pi − qi)ui,j
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
(pi − qi)
(
ui,j − m+m
2
)∣∣∣∣∣ (56)
≤ (∑
i
|pi − qi|
)
max
i
∣∣∣∣ui,j − m+m2
∣∣∣∣
≤ (2d1(p,q))
( |m−m|
2
)
, (57)
where (56) follows from the fact that (m+m)/2 is constant and
∑
i pi =
∑
i qi = 1.
To prove Theorem 23, the key step is to relate the Re´nyi divergence to variance.
Remember that d2(p,q) = log(1 + χ
2(p,q)). The following lemma follows from the
Chapman–Robbins bound:
Lemma 38. Take an arbitrary sequence of real numbers (x1, x2, . . . , xn) and two probabil-
ity distributions p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) and q = (q1, q2, . . . , qn). Let W be a random variable
that takes value xi with probability qi, and W˜ be a random variable that takes value xi
with probability pi. Then, we have
χ2(p,q) ≥ (E[W ]− E[W˜ ])
2
Var[W ]
. (58)
Furthermore, the above inequality becomes an equality if we set xi = (pi − qi)/qi.
Observe that the left hand side of (58) depends only on the probability values pi and
qi, while the right hand side depends not only on the probabilities, but also the values
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that W and W˜ take. Using this lemma and the fact that E[W˜ ] < w2 < w1 ≤ E[W ], we
can conclude
χ2(p,q) ≥ (E[W ]− w2)
2
Var[W ]
.
Observe that m ≤ W ≤ m holds with probability one. The proof is finished by the
following lemma.
Lemma 39. For any w1 > w2, we have
(E[W ]− w2)2
Var[W ]
≥ (w1 − w2)
2
(w1 −m)(m− w1) ,
provided that E[W ] ≥ w1, and m ≤ W ≤ m.
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix C.
6.4. Proof of Theorem 25
In this section we provide additional details and build a geometric picture. This picture
implies Theorem 25, but also gives a geometric interpretation of Nash strategies.
Let
L(a1, a2, . . . , an) = Val(U + a1
T ), ∀a ∈ Rn.
Observe that the table U˜ can be intuitively understood as giving an additional incentive
ai to Alice for playing her i-th action (it is actually a disincentive if ai < 0). Also, since
L(a1 + c, a2 + c, . . . , an + c) = L(a1, a2, . . . , an) + c,
we only need to understand L when the sum of the incentives ai is zero.
We need the following definition:
Definition 40. Let
K(p1, p2, . . . , pn) = min
j
∑
i
piui,j
be the payoff that Alice can guarantee with playing distribution (p1, . . . , pn) with table U.
We extend the definition of K(·) to arbitrary (p1, p2, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn by setting
K(p1, p2, . . . , pn) = −∞,
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when the tuple (p1, p2, . . . , pn) does not form a valid probability distribution, i.e., when any
of the pi’s becomes negative, or
∑
i pi 6= 1.
Note that
PU(w) =
{
p
∣∣∣K(p) ≥ w} .
A full geometric picture of PU(w) as well as Nash strategies are provided in the following
theorem:
Theorem 41. We have
1. The function L(a1, a2, . . . , an) is the convex conjugate dual of K(p1, p2, . . . , pn) in
the following sense:
L(a) = max
p∈Rn
[
K(p) +
n∑
i=1
piai
]
, ∀a ∈ Rn. (59)
The function L(a1, a2, . . . , an) is jointly convex in (a1, a2, . . . , an), while K(p1, p2, . . . , pn)
is jointly concave in (p1, p2, . . . , pn).
Furthermore, the supporting hyperplanes to the convex curve a 7→ L(a) characterize
Alice’s Nash strategies as follows: for any arbitrary a, p is a Nash strategy of Alice
for table U˜ = U + a1T if and only if p is a subgradient of the function L at a. In
other words, take some arbitrary vector a. Then,
L(b1, b2, . . . , bn) ≥ L(a1, a2, . . . , an) +
∑
i
(bi − ai)pi, ∀b ∈ Rn, (60)
if and only if p is a Nash strategy of Alice for the payoff table U˜ = U + a1T .
2. Given a probability vector p, we have
L(a1, a2, . . . , an) ≥ w +
∑
i
(ai − bi)pi, ∀a,
if and only if p guarantees a payoff of at least w for game U + b1T . In particular,
setting bi = 0,
L(a1, a2, . . . , an) ≥ w +
∑
i
aipi, ∀a, (61)
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if and only if p guarantees a payoff of at least w for game U, i.e., p ∈ PU(w). Thus,
having a payoff w, we look for hyperplanes of the form w+
∑
i piai that pass through
w at (a1, a2, . . . , an) = (0, 0, . . . , 0), and lie below the curve of L.
Observe that the second part of Theorem 41 is equivalent with Theorem 25.
Proof of Theorem 41. We begin with the first part of the theorem. Using the max-min
formulation for the value of a game U˜, we have
L(a1, a2, . . . , an) = max
pi≥0,
∑
i pi=1
min
j
∑
i
pi(ui,j + ai)
= max
pi≥0,
∑
i pi=1
[(
min
j
∑
i
piui,j
)
+
∑
i
piai
]
= max
pi≥0,
∑
i pi=1
[
K(p1, p2, . . . , pn) +
∑
i
piai
]
= max
pi∈R
[
K(p1, p2, . . . , pn) +
∑
i
piai
]
, (62)
where (62) follows from the fact that K(p) is minus infinity when p is not a probability
distribution. This shows the duality of L(·) and K(·). Next, note that K(·) is a minimum
of linear functions; hence it is a concave function. Convexity of L(·) can be directly seen
from (60) which implies that at least one supporting hyperplane to its curve exists at
any given point (since at least one Nash strategy exists for any arbitrary game). Thus, it
remains to prove (60).
Without loss of generality, it suffices to prove (60) for b = 0 (bi = 0), and get the
result for arbitrary b by changing variable U→ U + b1T . The inequality
L(a1, a2, . . . , an) ≥ L(0, 0, . . . , 0) +
∑
i
aipi, ∀a, (63)
can be also expressed as
min
a
(
L(a1, a2, . . . , an)−
∑
i
aipi
)
≥ L(0, 0, . . . , 0).
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From the duality relation (62) and utilizing the Fenchel’s duality theorem, the left hand
side is K(p1, p2, . . . , pn). Thus, the expression is equivalent with (63) can be written as
K(p1, p2, . . . , pn) ≥ L(0, 0, . . . , 0) = Val(U),
which is equivalent with p being a Nash strategy.
The proof for the second part of the theorem is similar. As before bi can be set to
zero. Then, we can express (61) as
min
a
(
L(a1, a2, . . . , an)−
∑
i
aipi
)
≥ w.
From the duality relation (62) and the Fenchel’s duality theorem, this is equivalent with
K(p1, p2, . . . , pn) ≥ w, or p ∈ PU(w).
6.5. Proof of Theorem 28
Let pA(a) be an arbitrary distribution that secures payoff w/2 in game U. Observe
that pA1A2(a1, a2) = 1(a1 = a2)pA(a1) secures payoff w in game U ⊕ U, where 1(·) is the
indicator function. In this case, H(pA1A2) = H(pA); thus, the function FU⊕U(w) is bounded
above as follows:
FU⊕U(w) ≤ FU(w
2
). (64)
On the other hand, let p∗A1A2 ∈ PU⊕U(w) be a distribution with minimum entropy that
secures arbitrary payoff w in game U ⊕ U, i.e., H(p∗A1A2) = FU⊕U(w). Note that such a
distribution p∗A1A2 exists because PU⊕U(w) is compact. We have
w ≤ min
j1,j2∈B
Ep∗A1A2 [uA1,j1 + uA2,j2 ]
= min
j1,j2∈B
(
Ep∗A1A2 [uA1,j1 ] + Ep∗A1A2 [uA2,j2 ]
)
= min
j1∈B
Ep∗A1 [uA1,j1 ] + minj2∈B
Ep∗A2 [uA2,j2 ], (65)
where p∗A1 and p
∗
A2
are the marginal distributions of p∗A1A2 . Equation (65) implies that
there exists k ∈ {1, 2} such that
min
jk∈B
Ep∗Ak [uAk,jk ] ≥
w
2
.
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Thus, p∗Ak secures payoff w/2 in game U. Hence,
FU⊕U(w) = H(p∗A1A2)
(a)
≥ H(p∗Ak) ≥ FU(
w
2
), (66)
where (a) follows from the properties of entropy.
Equations (64) and (66) conclude FU⊕U(w) = FU(w/2). The above line of proof can be
extended for every natural number k to prove F⊕kU(w) = FU(w/k).
6.6. Proof of Theorem 32
If v = m, then there exists a pure strategy a ∈ A that guarantees the maximum
achievable payoff m in any permissible payoff table U′. Pure strategies have zero entropy
and G
(4)
U (w) = 0. The explicit expression that we wish to prove for G
(4)
U (w) also vanishes
as v tends to m, hence, the claim holds when v = m. Therefore, for the rest of the proof
we suppose that v < m.
We claim that an optimal table for the minimization problem in the statement of the
theorem is as follows:
U∗ =

m m m m · · · m
m v m m · · · m
m m v m · · · m
m m m v · · · m
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
m m m · · · · · · v

m×m
, (67)
where the above square table is of size m = b(m − v)/(m − w)c + 2. We first show that
there is an optimal payoff table with the structure given in (67) for some value of m and
then optimize over m, the size of the table.
Take some arbitrary feasible table U′ = [u′i,j] and distribution p ∈ PU′(w). Since
mini∈Aminj∈B u′i,j = m, there exists a row i and a column j such that u
′
i,j = m. By
reordering the rows and columns of the table, we may assume that u′1,1 = m. Furthermore,
since maxi∈Aminj∈B u′i,j = v, for all i, there exists a ji such that u
′
i,ji
≤ v. Thus, for all
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i ∈ A and j ∈ B we have u′i,j ≤ u′′i,j, where U′′ = [u′′i,j] is defined as follows:
u′′i,j =

m, i = 1, j = 1,
m, i = 1, j 6= 1,
m, i 6= 1, j 6= ji,
v, i 6= 1, j = ji.
The table U′′ has higher payoffs for Alice than the table U′ in each cell. Hence, p ∈ PU′′(w).
The table U′′ also belongs to the feasible set of the minimization problem because it has
one row containing one entry with value m and all other rows contain an entry with value
v.
Next, we can do two more operations: if there is a column with all m entries, we delete
that column. Because we are restricting the action set of Bob, Alice can still secure payoff
w with the same distribution p. If two rows of the table U′′ are the same, we can merge
them together into one row. In other words, for instance the second and third rows are the
same, i.e., j2 = j3, we can merge the second and third rows together and assign the sum
probability p2 + p3 to this merged row. This will reduce the entropy of the probability
vector p while leaving the payoff of Alice unchanged. With these two operations and
row/column permutation, we either obtain the table given in (67) for some value of m, or
the following m× (m− 1) table
m m m m · · · m
v m m m · · · m
m v m m · · · m
m m v m · · · m
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
m m m · · · · · · v

m×(m−1)
. (68)
One can directly verify that any probability distribution p for the payoff of Alice from
the table in (68) is less than or equal to the payoff of Alice from the table in (67).
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Having showed that a table with the structure given in (67) is optimal, we now optimize
over m, the size of the table, and compute G
(4)
U (w). The constraint p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm) ∈
PU(w) is equivalent to:
mp1 +m(1− p1) ≥ w,
vpi +m(1− pi) ≥ w, ∀i > 1,
which simplifies to
p1 ≤ m− w
m−m, pi ≤
m− w
m− v , ∀i > 1. (69)
We claim that without loss of generality, we can assume that p1 = 0. Since
m−w
m−v ≥ m−wm−m ,
we have p1 ≤ m−wm−v . Now, if we have a distribution (p1, p2, . . . , pm) on a table of the
form (67) for some m, we can consider the distribution (0, p1, p2, . . . , pm) on a table with
size m + 1; the entropy of (0, p1, p2, . . . , pm) is the same as (p1, p2, . . . , pm) and achieves
the payoff of w. Therefore, the problem essentially reduces to the following: what is
the minimum possible entropy for the set of all probability distributions (p1, p2, . . . , pm)
satisfying
p1 = 0, pi ≤ m− w
m− v , ∀i = 2, . . . ,m. (70)
Note that we should choose m large enough to ensure that the set of probability distri-
butions satisfying (70) is non-empty. An optimal choice is to take m = m∗ for any m∗
satisfying m∗ ≥ b(m− v)/(m− w)c+ 2. The optimal pmf p∗ is as follows:
p∗i =

(m− w)/(m− v), i = 2, . . . , b(m− v)/(m− w)c+ 1,
1− b(m− v)/(m− w)c(m− w)/(m− v), i = b(m− v)/(m− w)c+ 2
0, otherwise.
The distribution p∗ is the pmf that includes as much elements with value (m−w)/(m−v)
as possible. This distribution has minimum entropy because it majorizes all other pmfs
in PU(w) (Nielsen, 2002, Theorem 8.0.1). In other words, for any distribution p satisfying
(70), and for all i ≤ m∗, we have ∑i`=1 p∗↓` ≥ ∑i`=1 p↓` , where for a probability mass
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function p = (p1, p2, . . . , pm), we let p
↓ = (p↓1, p
↓
2, . . . , p
↓
m) be the vector whose elements
are the elements of p reordered into non-decreasing order.
The entropy of p∗ equals
H(p∗) = −
⌊
m− v
m− w
⌋
m− w
m− v log
(
m− w
m− v
)
−(
1−
⌊
m− v
m− w
⌋
m− w
m− v
)
log
(
1−
⌊
m− v
m− w
⌋
m− w
m− v
)
as desired.
6.7. Proof of Theorem 34
Let p∗ be a Nash strategy for player A whereH(p∗) = h∗ and i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈Aminj∈B ui,j
be the pure strategy that guarantees payoff v for player A. For v ≤ w ≤ w∗ define
α = (w∗−w)/(w∗− v) and p = αei∗ + (1−α)p∗ where ei∗ is a vector of all zero elements
except for its i∗-th element which is 1. The pmf p guarantees payoff w since
pTU = αeTi∗U + (1− α)p∗TU ≥ αv1 + (1− α)w∗1 = w1.
Using the properties of entropy one can inspect that:
H(p) ≤ αH(ei∗)+(1−α)H(p∗)+H(α, 1−α) = (1−α)h∗−α log2(α)−(1−α) log2(1−α).
Therefore, FU(w) ≤ H(p) ≤ (1 − α)h∗ − α log2(α) − (1 − α) log2(1 − α). In addition, as
h∗ secures payoff w∗ ≥ w, we have FU(w) ≤ h∗. These two facts imply FU(w) ≤ Q(1)U (w)
once we substitute the value of α.
From the definition of p∗max,i, it follows that p
∗
max,i ∈ PU(w). Therefore, for every
i ∈ A, FU(w) ≤ H(p∗max,i) and FU(w) ≤ Q(2)U (w) follows.
For an arbitrary j ∈ B, if p′ ∈ {p ∈ PU(w) :
∑
i∈A piui,j = w}, then, since p′ also
belongs to PU(w), we have FU(w) ≤ H(p′). Hence, for every j ∈ B:
FU(w) ≤ max
p∈PU(w):
∑
i∈A piui,j=w
H(p).
The above inequality is correct for every j ∈ B, thus, FU(w) ≤ Q(3)U (w).
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Appendix A. Review of the randomness extraction literature
In this appendix, we review some results about randomness extraction which plays a
key role in the construction of optimal strategies for the maximizer in the repeated games
studied in this paper. The results of this section are adopted from Renner (2008) who
considered the randomness extraction problem in the framework of quantum information
theory.
Randomness extraction is the process of deriving some almost fair random bits from
a given source X. More precisely, let X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y be two random variables with
joint distribution pXY and let f : X → {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2`} be a deterministic mapping such
that for B = f(X) and  > 0 we have∥∥∥pBY − pUBpY ∥∥∥
TV
≤ ,
where pBY is the joint distribution of B and Y and p
U
B is the uniform distribution on
{1, 2, 3, . . . , 2`}. Then, we say f extracts ` fair bits independent of Y from X with
precision .
To precede, we need the definition of conditional collision entropy for a given pair of
random variables. The following subsection is devoted for this definition.
Appendix A.1. Conditional collision entropy
Let X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y be two random variables with joint probability distribution
pXY , and let qY be an arbitrary probability distribution on the sample space Y . The
conditional collision entropy of pXY given qY is defined as follows:
5
H2(pXY |qY ) = − log
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
pXY (x, y)
2
qY (y)
,
and the conditional collision entropy of pXY given Y is defined as:
H2(pXY |Y ) = max
qY ∈∆(Y)
H2(pXY |qY ).
5In this and upcoming definitions, we set qY (y)/pXY (x, y) to be zero if qY (y) = pXY (x, y) = 0, and
infinity if qY (y) > 0 while pXY (x, y) = 0.
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The conditional collision entropy, as defined above, is not a continuous function of the
input probability distribution and a slight change of the probability distribution might
result in a large deviation in its conditional collision entropy. The smoothed version of
conditional collision entropy resolves this drawback. Let  be an arbitrary positive number
and pXY and qY be some probability distributions on X × Y and Y , respectively. The
-smooth conditional collision entropy of pXY given qY is
H2(pXY |qY ) = max
pXY ∈B(pXY )
H2(pXY |qY ),
where
B(pXY ) = {pXY ∈ ∆(X × Y); ‖pXY − pXY ‖TV ≤ }.
As before, the -smooth conditional collision entropy of pXY given Y is defined as
H2(pXY |Y ) = max
qY ∈∆(Y)
H2(pXY |qY ).
In the following remark, we show that for i.i.d. sources the smoothed conditional
collision entropy is related to the Shannon entropy of the source.
Remark 42. Let (Xn, Y n) ∈ X n×Yn be drawn i.i.d. from probability distribution pXY =
pY pX|Y and for arbitrary  > 0, the set of typical sequences, τ
(n)
 , be defined as
τ (n) =
{
(xn, yn) ∈ X n × Yn :
∣∣∣∣− 1n log pXn|Y n(xn|yn)−H(X|Y )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ } ,
where pXn|Y n(xn|yn) =
∏n
i=1 pX|Y (xi|yi) is the conditional distribution of Xn given Y n.
Considering that E[− log pX|Y (X|Y )] = H(X|Y ) and
− 1
n
log pXn|Y n(Xn|Y n) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
− log pX|Y (Xi|Yi),
the weak law of large numbers implies that for sufficiently large n,
Pr
[
(Xn, Y n) ∈ τ (n)
] ≥ 1− . (A.1)
Next, let pXnY n be a probability distribution on X n × Yn defined as
pXnY n(x
n, yn) =

pXnY n (x
n,yn)
Pr
[
(Xn,Y n)∈τ (n)
] (xn, yn) ∈ τ (n) ,
0 otherwise.
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The definition above along with Equation (A.1) implies that ‖pXnY n−pXnY n‖TV ≤  holds
for sufficiently large n. Therefore, for sufficiently large n, we have
H2(pXnY n|Y n) ≥ H2(pXnY n|pY n)
= − log
 ∑
(xn,yn)∈Xn×Yn
pXnY n(x
n, yn)
pXnY n(x
n, yn)
pY n(y
n)

≥ − log
(
max
(xn,yn)∈Xn×Yn
pXn|Y n(x
n|yn)
)
= − log
(
max
(xn,yn)∈τ (n)
pXn|Y n(xn|yn)
)
≥ n(H(X|Y )− ).
Appendix A.2. Randomness extraction
In this subsection, we present the main tools regarding the extraction of randomness
from a given source with known distribution.
Theorem 43 (Theorem 5.5.1, Renner (2008)). Let X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y be two random
variables with joint distribution pXY . For arbitrary ` let F : X → {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2`} be a
random mapping constructed by assigning to F (x) uniformly at random one element of
{1, 2, 3, . . . , 2`} and independently for distinct inputs x, x′ ∈ X . Then, we have∑
f
pF (f)
∥∥pf(X)Y − pUBpY ∥∥TV ≤ 122− 12 (H2(pXY |Y )−`),
where the summation is over all deterministic mappings f : X → {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2`}, pF is
the probability distribution of the random mapping F , pf(X)Y is the joint distribution of Y
and f(X), and pUB is the uniform distribution on the set {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2`}. Therefore, there
exists a deterministic mapping f : X → {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2`} such that
∥∥pf(X)Y − pUBpY ∥∥TV ≤ 122− 12 (H2(pXY |Y )−`).
Proof. To begin the proof we need a corollary of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality stated in
the following lemma.
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Lemma 44. Let s1, s2, . . . , sn and γ1, γ2, . . . , γn be two sequences of real numbers such
that for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n, γi ≥ 0 and
∑n
i=1 γi ≤ k, where k > 0. Then,
n∑
i=1
|si| ≤
√√√√k( n∑
i=1
s2i
γi
),
where 0/0 is taken as being zero and 1/0 =∞.
Proof. If for some i, |si| > 0 and γi = 0 then the right hand side of the inequality in
the statement of the lemma becomes infinity and hence it holds. Otherwise, let for all
i = 1, . . . , n, if |si| > 0, then γi > 0; hence, by using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have
n∑
i=1
|si| =
n∑
i=1
√
γi
|si|√
γi
≤
√√√√( n∑
i=1
γi)(
n∑
i=1
s2i
γi
) ≤
√√√√k( n∑
i=1
s2i
γi
),
where we take 0/0 = 0 in accordance with the statement of the lemma.
Let qY be an arbitrary probability distribution on Y and f be an arbitrary realization
of F , then, from Lemma 44 we have
‖pf(X)Y − pUBpY ‖TV =
1
2
2`∑
b=1
∑
y∈Y
|pf(X)Y (b, y)− pUB(b)pY (y)|
≤ 1
2
√√√√2`( 2`∑
b=1
∑
y∈Y
|pf(X)Y (b, y)− pUB(b)pY (y)|2
qY (y)
)
=
1
2
√√√√2`(∑
y∈Y
pY (y)2
qY (y)
2`∑
b=1
∣∣pf(X)|Y (b|y)− pUB(b)∣∣2
)
. (A.2)
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The term
∑2`
b=1 |pf(X)|Y (b|y)− pUB(b)|2 is characterized as
2`∑
b=1
∣∣∣pf(X)|Y (b|y)− pUB(b)∣∣∣2
=
2`∑
b=1
∣∣pf(X)|Y (b|y)− 2−`∣∣2
=
2`∑
b=1
(
pf(X)|Y (b|y)2 − 2× 2−`pf(X)|Y (b|y) + 2−2`
)
=
 2`∑
b=1
pf(X)|Y (b|y)2
− 2−` (A.3)
=
∑
x,x′∈X
pX|Y (x|y)pX|Y (x′|y)
(
1(f(x) = f(x′))− 2−`) (A.4)
=
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)2
(
1− 2−`)
+
∑
x 6=x′
pX|Y (x|y)pX|Y (x′|y)
(
1(f(x) = f(x′))− 2−`)
≤
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)2 +
∑
x 6=x′
pX|Y (x|y)pX|Y (x′|y)
(
1(f(x) = f(x′))− 2−`) ,
(A.5)
where 1(·) is the indicator function and Equation (A.3) is implied by the following fact:
2`∑
b=1
(−2×2−`pf(X)|Y (b|y)+2−2`) = −2×2−`
 2`∑
b=1
pf(X)|Y (b|y)
+2−2`×2` = −2×2−`+2−` = −2−`,
where we used
∑2`
b=1 pf(X)|Y (b|y) = 1. To justify Equation (A.4), note that
∑2`
b=1 pf(X)|Y (b|y)2
is the probability of the event f(X ′) = f(X ′′), where X ′ and X ′′ are i.i.d. random variables
with distribution pX|Y=y, i.e., pX′X′′(x, x′) = pX|Y (x|y)pX|Y (x′|y). On the other hand, the
probability of the event f(X ′) = f(X ′′) is also characterized as∑
x,x′∈X
pX|Y (x|y)pX|Y (x′|y)1(f(x) = f(x′)).
Thus,
2`∑
b=1
pf(X)|Y (b|y)2 =
∑
x,x′∈X
pX|Y (x|y)pX|Y (x′|y)1(f(x) = f(x′)).
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The above equation along with the fact that
∑
x,x′∈X pX|Y (x|y)pX|Y (x′|y) = 1 implies
Equation (A.4).
Next, by taking the average of
∑2`
b=1
∣∣pf(X)|Y (b|y)− pUB(b)∣∣2 with respect to F we have
∑
f
pF (f)
2`∑
b=1
∣∣∣pf(X)|Y (b|y)− pUB(b)∣∣∣2
≤
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)2 +
∑
x 6=x′
pX|Y (x|y)pX|Y (x′|y)
(∑
f
pF (f)1(f(x) = f(x
′))− 2−`
)
=
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)2 +
∑
x 6=x′
pX|Y (x|y)pX|Y (x′|y)
(
Pr[F (x) = F (x′)]− 2−`)
=
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)2, (A.6)
where the inequality follows from (A.5), and the last equality holds because for distinct
x, x′ ∈ X , F (x) coincides with F (x′) with probability 2−`. Therefore,
∑
f
pF (f)
∥∥pf(X)Y − pUBpY ∥∥TV ≤ 12 ∑
f
pF (f)
√√√√2`(∑
y∈Y
pY (y)2
qY (y)
2`∑
b=1
∣∣pf(X)|Y (b|y)− pUB(b)∣∣2
)
≤ 1
2
√√√√2`(∑
y∈Y
pY (y)2
qY (y)
∑
f
pF (f)
2`∑
b=1
∣∣pf(X)|Y (b|y)− pUB(b)∣∣2
)
≤ 1
2
√√√√2`(∑
y∈Y
pY (y)2
qY (y)
∑
x∈X
pX|Y (x|y)2
)
=
1
2
√√√√√2`
 ∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
pXY (x, y)2
qY (y)

=
1
2
2−
1
2
(H2(pXY |qY )−`),
where the first inequality follows from (A.2), the second inequality follows from utilizing
the Jensen’s inequality for concave function
√·, the third inequality follows from (A.6),
and the second equality follows from the definition of H2(pXY |qY ). Since qY is arbitrary,
the claim of the theorem is implied by the above inequality.
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Now, we can utilize Theorem 43 to obtain another bound in terms of the smoothed
conditional collision entropy. Let  > 0 be an arbitrary real number, and X ∈ X and Y ∈
Y be two random variables with joint probability distribution pXY . Let pXY ∈ B(pXY )
be the probability distribution such that
H2(pXY |Y ) = H2(pXY |Y ),
and f : X → {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2`} be the mapping of Theorem 43 satisfying∥∥pf(X)Y − pUBpY ∥∥TV ≤ 122− 12 (H2(pXY |Y )−`) = 122− 12(H2(pXY |Y )−`), (A.7)
where pf(X)Y is the joint distribution of (f(X), Y ) when (X, Y ) is distributed according
to pXY , and pY is the marginal distribution of pXY with respect to Y . Then, we have∥∥pf(X)Y − pUBpY ∥∥TV ≤ ∥∥pf(X)Y − pf(X)Y ∥∥TV + ∥∥pf(X)Y − pUBpY ∥∥TV + ∥∥pUBpY − pUBpY ∥∥TV
≤ 2+ 1
2
2−
1
2(H2(pXY |Y )−`),
where the first inequality results from the triangular inequality for the total variation
distance, and the second inequality follows from (A.7) and the following two facts:
• ∥∥pf(X)Y − pf(X)Y ∥∥TV ≤ ‖pXY − pXY ‖TV ≤  : This is a consequence of the forth
property of the total variation distance in Lemma 1.
• ∥∥pUBpY − pUBpY ∥∥TV = ‖pY − pY ‖TV ≤ ‖pXY − pXY ‖TV ≤  : The equality and the
first inequality follow from the fifth and the second property (respectively) of the
total variation distance in Lemma 1.
Therefore, the following corollary of Theorem 43 is concluded.
Corollary 45. For random variables X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y with joint distribution pXY and
 > 0, there exists a deterministic mapping f : X → {1, 2, . . . . , 2`} such that∥∥pf(X)Y − pUBpY ∥∥TV ≤ 2+ 122− 12(H2(pXY |Y )−`),
where pUB is the uniform distribution on {1, 2, . . . , 2`}.
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Next, we utilize Corollary 45 in combination with Remark 42 to conclude that for the
random sequence (Xn, Y n) drawn i.i.d. from pXY there exists a mapping that extracts
almost nH(X|Y ) bits from Xn with desired precision given that n is sufficiently large.
This is the claim of Lemma 37 in Section 6.1. We finish this section by restating Lemma 37
and providing its formal proof.
Lemma 37. Consider the correlated random sequences Xn and Y n drawn i.i.d. from re-
spective spaces X and Y by joint probability distribution pXY . Let Q(n) be a random vari-
able independent of Y n and uniformly distributed on {1, 2, . . . , 2Rn}, where R < H(X|Y )
is a real number; then, there exist mappings Bn : X n → {1, 2, . . . , 2Rn} such that
lim
n→∞
‖pBn(Xn)Y n − pQ(n)pY n‖TV = 0.
Proof. For arbitrary δ > 0 choose some positive number  such that  < δ/2 and  <
H(X|Y )−R. Let Bn be the mapping of Corollary 45 satisfying
‖pBn(Xn)Y n − pQ(n)pY n‖TV ≤ 2+
1
2
2−
1
2(H2(pXnY n |Y n)−nR).
Then, by using Remark 42, for sufficiently large n we have
‖pBn(Xn)Y n − pQ(n)pY n‖TV ≤ 2+
1
2
2−
n
2
(H(X|Y )−R−).
Since  < δ/2 and H(X|Y ) − R −  > 0, there exists a natural number n0 such that for
all n > n0, 2+
1
2
2−
n
2
(H(X|Y )−R−) ≤ δ; hence, for sufficiently large n,
‖pBn(Xn)Y n − pQ(n)pY n‖TV ≤ δ,
which finishes the proof.
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 20
First, we show that the cardinality of random variable R can be reduced to two.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that pR(r) > 0 for all r ∈ R. We will alter
the joint distribution pRQAS and construct a new joint distribution p
′
RQAS on the same
alphabet sets such that
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• p′RQAS still satisfies the constraints (12)-(14) and (30);
• p′R(r) > 0 for only two values of r, i.e., the support of R under distribution p′RQAS
is of cardinality at most two.
Let
p′QAS|R(q, a, s|r) = pQAS|R(q, a, s|r), ∀(q, a, s, r).
In other words, the distributions p and p′ differ only in the marginal distribution of R.
Observe that with this choice of p′QAS|R = pQAS|R, Equations (12) and (13) are satisfied
for p′RQAS regardless of how we choose the marginal distribution of R; these properties
are inherited from pRQAS.
To specify the joint distribution p′RQAS, we need to specify p
′
R(r) for different values of
r ∈ R. We can think of the marginal distribution p′R as a vector of size |R| of non-negative
numbers adding up to one, i.e., a vector [p′R(r), r ∈ R] in the probability simplex
p′R(r) ≥ 0, ,∀r ∈ R, (B.1)∑
r∈R
p′R(r) = 1. (B.2)
Let H(.|.) and H ′(.|.) denote the entropy function under distributions pRQAS and p′RQAS,
respectively. Similarly, let pi(A|R) and pi′(A|R) represent the security level of A given R
under distributions pRQAS and p
′
RQAS, respectively. The expression
H ′(QA|SR)−H ′(Q|R) =
∑
r∈R
p′R(r) [H
′(QA|S,R = r)−H ′(Q|R = r)]
is linear in p′R(r). We impose the following linear constraint on p
′
R(r):∑
r∈R
p′R(r) [H
′(QA|S,R = r)−H ′(Q|R = r)] = H(QA|SR)−H(Q|R). (B.3)
This linear constraint implies that H ′(QA|SR) − H ′(Q|R) = H(QA|SR) − H(Q|R).
This would ensure (14) for p′RQAS. Now, consider the polytope P formed by real vectors
[p′R(r), r ∈ R] of size |R| satisfying (B.1)-(B.3). This polytope is non-empty as it includes
the vector corresponding to the marginal distribution [pR(r)]. The expression pi
′(A|R) is
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also a linear expression in p′R(r) for r ∈ R. The maximum of the linear function pi′(A|R)
over polytope P occurs at a vertex of P. We choose the distribution corresponding to this
vertex. Thus, pi′(A|R) ≥ pi(A|R) and (30) is satisfied under p′RQAS. Next, it suffices to
show that each vertex of P corresponds to a joint distribution p′R(r) with at most two non-
negative entries. The polytope P is defined via |R|+ 2 hyperplanes given in (B.1)-(B.3).
Since P lies in a space of dimension |R|, each of its vertices must lie at the intersection of
at least |R| hyperplanes defining P. In other words, each vertex must lie on at least |R|
of the |R|+ 2 hyperplanes given in (B.1)-(B.3). This implies that each vertex must lie on
at least |R| − 2 hyperplanes of the type given in (B.1). In other words, each vertex must
have at least |R| − 2 zero entries, and hence at most two non-zero entries.
Next, we alter the joint distribution p′RQAS and construct a new joint distribution
p′′RQAS on the same alphabet sets such that
• p′′RQAS still satisfies the constraints (12)-(14) and (30);
• p′′Q(q) > 0 for at most 2|A| values of q, i.e., the size of the support of Q under
distribution p′′RQAS is at most 2|A|.
Let
p′′R(r) = p
′
R(r), p
′′
AS|RQ(a, s|r, q) = p′AS|RQ(a, s|r, q), ∀(a, s, r, q). (B.4)
In other words, the marginal distribution on R and the conditional distribution on AS
given RQ are preserved. We will now choose p′′Q|R to fulfill the definition of the joint
distribution p′′. Equation (B.4) implies that Equations (12) and (13) are satisfied under
p′′. For arbitrary r ∈ R satisfying p′′R(r) > 0, as before, we interpret p′′Q|R=r as a real
vector of size |Q| in the probability simplex
p′′Q|R=r(q) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ Q, (B.5)∑
q∈Q
p′′Q|R=r(q) = 1. (B.6)
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Note that p′′A|R=r(a) =
∑
q∈Q p
′′
Q|R=r(q)p
′′
A|Q,R=r(a|q) is a linear function of p′′Q|R=r, so we
impose the following linear constraints on p′′Q|R=r:
p′′A|R=r(a) = p
′
A|R=r(a), ∀a ∈ A− {a0}, (B.7)
where a0 is an arbitrary element of A and A−{a0} is the set A from which a0 is excluded.
Consider that as p′′A|R=r and p
′
A|R=r both sum up to one, Equation (B.7) guarantees that
p′′A|R=r(a0) = p
′
A|R=r(a0), thus p
′′
A|R=r = p
′
A|R=r. The fact that p
′′
A|R=r = p
′
A|R=r, along
with Equation (B.4), implies
pi′′(A|R) = pi′(A|R), (B.8)
H ′′(S|R) = H ′(S|R), (B.9)
where H ′′(.|.) denotes the entropy function and pi′′(A|R) denotes the security level of A
given R, both under the distribution p′′RQAS. Equation (B.8) implies that Equation (30)
is satisfied under p′′RQAS. Let P
′ denote the polytope of all conditional distributions
p′′Q|R=r satisfying (B.5)-(B.7). Note that P
′ is non-empty since it includes p′Q|R=r. We
choose p′′Q|R=r to be a vertex of P
′ that maximizes H ′′(AS|Q,R = r) (linear in p′′Q|R=r).
Therefore, we have H ′′(AS|Q,R = r) ≥ H ′(AS|Q,R = r) and considering that p′′R = p′R,
we conclude that
H ′′(AS|QR) ≥ H ′(AS|QR). (B.10)
Then, using Equations (B.9) and (B.10), we have
H ′′(QA|RS)−H ′′(Q|R) = H ′′(AS|RQ)−H ′′(S|R)
≥ H ′(AS|RQ)−H ′(S|R)
= H ′(QA|RS)−H ′(Q|R)
≥ 0,
where the equations follow from the properties of the entropy function, the first inequality
follows from Equations (B.9) and (B.10), and the last inequality follows from the fact that
p′ satisfies (14). Thus, Equation (14) is satisfied under p′′RQAS. Next, we complete the
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proof by showing that the support of Q under the distribution p′′RQAS has cardinality of
at most 2|A|. To do this, it suffices to show that for arbitrary r ∈ R for which p′′R(r) > 0,
the conditional distribution p′′Q|R=r has cardinality at most |A|. Then, from the fact that
p′′R(r) > 0 for only two values of r ∈ R, we can conclude that under p′′RQAS, the support of
Q has cardinality at most 2|A|. Note that the polytope P′ belongs to a space of dimension
|Q|, thus, every vertex of P′ lies in the intersection of at least |Q| hyperplanes defining
P′ (Equations (B.5)-(B.7)). On the other hand, P′ is defined by |Q| + |A| hyperplanes
of which |Q| hyperplanes are of the type given in (B.5); thus, every vertex of P′ lies in
at least |Q| − |A| hyperplanes of the type given in (B.5). Therefore, p′′Q|R=r has at least
|Q| − |A| zero-valued entries and hence at most |A| non-zero entries.
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 39
Let us minimize the expression (E[W ]−w2)2/Var[W ] over all random variables W that
satisfy m ≤ W ≤ m and E[W ] ≥ w1 :
min
m≤W≤m
E[W ]≥w1
(E[W ]− w2)2
Var[W ]
= min
w1≤µ≤m
 min
m≤W≤m
E[W ]=µ
(E[W ]− w2)2
Var[W ]
 = min
w1≤µ≤m
 (µ− w2)2max
m≤W≤m
E[W ]=µ
Var[W ]

= min
w1≤µ≤m
 (µ− w2)2−µ2 + max
m≤W≤m
E[W ]=µ
E[W 2]
 . (C.1)
We claim that
max
m≤W≤m
E[W ]=µ
E[W 2] = (m− µ)(µ−m) + µ2. (C.2)
Observe that if W ∗ is the following binary random variable
P[W ∗ = m] =
m− µ
m−m, P[W
∗ = m] =
µ−m
m−m, (C.3)
we have E[W ∗] = µ and E[(W ∗)2] = (m− µ)(µ−m) + µ2. As a result,
max
m≤W≤m
E[W ]=µ
E[W 2] ≥ (m− µ)(µ−m) + µ2. (C.4)
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On the other hand, the function f(x) = x2 is convex and lies below the line that connects
the two points (m,m2) and (m,m2) for any x ∈ [m,m], i.e.,
x2 ≤ m2 + (x−m)(m+m), ∀x ∈ [m,m].
Thus,
E[W 2] ≤ m2 + (E[W ]−m)(m+m) = (m− µ)(µ−m) + µ2.
Thus, Equation (C.2) holds. As a result, Equation (C.1) becomes
min
m≤W≤m
E[W ]≥w1
(E[W ]− w2)2
Var[W ]
= min
w1≤µ≤m
g(µ), (C.5)
where
g(µ) =
(µ− w2)2
(m− µ)(µ−m) .
Note that the function g(·) is increasing for any µ satisfying m ≤ w2 ≤ µ ≤ m as
dg(µ)
dµ
=
(µ− w2) [(m− µ)(µ+ w2 − 2m) + (µ−m)(µ− w2)]
(m− µ)2(µ−m)2 ≥ 0.
Since w2 ≤ w1, this would then imply that the minimum on the right hand side of (C.5)
is obtained at µ = w1. This will complete the proof.
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